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ABSTRACT
VOIP TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION IN IPSEC TUNNELED NETWORKS
Traffic classification and identification in modern networks is of fundamen-
tal importance to both network management and security. Due to increas-
ing demand for security and Quality of Service (QoS) in converged networks,
accurate traffic classification becomes an integral part of network manage-
ment. This research presents a novel technique for Voice over Internet Proto-
col (VoIP) traffic classification in IP Security (IPSec) tunneled networks and
demonstrates how this can be used to achieve acceptable QoS in an overloaded
network. The proposed solution uses the well known IP tables framework and
its Application Programming Interface (API). Importantly the algorithm de-
veloped makes very low demands on CPU time and memory unlike other
algorithms found in the literature.
This work attracted attention from industry, Exinda Proprietary Limited
invested $ 7000 Australian dollars for ongoing research and its possible appli-
cation to commercial devices.
This research has been demonstrated and took its place in two IEEE (Insti-
tute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) sponsored conference proceedings,
one in Seoul, Korea (ICACT 2010) and another in Kyoto, Japan (ICEIE 2010).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Analysis of the application traffic mix has always been a major interest for network
operators. Collection of traffic statistics is currently performed either by flow moni-
tors, such as Cisco NetFlow, or by sophisticated network monitoring equipment that
captures one record for each (sampled) packet seen on a link. The former produces a
list of flow records capturing the number of bytes and packets seen, while the latter
produces a list of packet records that can be aggregated into 5-tuple flows (e.g. with
the same source, destination IP address, source, destination port, and protocol). The
subsequent mapping of flows, to application classes is not straightforward and has
recently attracted attention in the research community.
Accurate identification of network applications based on direct observation of
associated traffic patterns is in great demand for better network planning, adaptive
network based Quality of Service (QoS), dynamic access control or lawful interception.
There is a growing need for accurate and timely identification of network ap-
plications based on the observation of associated traffic flows. Also referred to as
”classification”, application identification is used for trend analysis.
Classification based on well-known TCP or UDP ports is becoming increasingly
1
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less efficient, due to increasing number of applications which can allocate dynamic
ports as needed. End users are deliberately using non-standard ports to hide their
traffic from firewalls and proxy servers. Also according to Karagiannis et. al. [1] the
use of network address port translation (NATP) is widespread (for example a large
portion of peer-to-peer file sharing traffic is using non-default ports).
Payload-based classification relies on some knowledge about the payload formats
for every application of interest: protocol decoding requires knowing and decoding
the payload format while signature matching relies on knowledge of at least some
characteristic patterns in the payload. Such approaches are limited by the fact that
classification rules must be updated whenever an application implements even a triv-
ial protocol change. Privacy laws and encryption can effectively make the payload
inaccessible.
Recently, some novel approaches treat the problem of application classification as
a statistical problem. These approaches develop discriminating criteria based on sta-
tistical observations and distributions of various flow properties in the packet traces.
Typically, such discriminating criteria refer to the packet size distribution per flow
and the inter arrival times between packets. However, the validation of a classifica-
tion method is a challenge. The effectiveness of most of the current approaches has
not been validated in a large scale, since there does not exist a reference point or a
benchmark trace with known application consistency.
Newly designed classification schemes not only lack the ability to be applied in
a corporate network but also have not been designed to work in IPSec tunneled
networks. The discussion in literature survey (See Chapter 2) about the existing and
proposed techniques for classification reveals the need for a simple and easy software
implementation which can be integrated into existing technology.
In order to address this issue, this research proposes an algorithm and software
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implementation which can be used both in IPSec tunneled networks and non-tunneled
networks for appropriate VoIP identification and prioritization.
1.1 Scope
The scope of this thesis ranges from basic Voice over IP architecture to IPSec protocol
suite, from Linux Netfilter libraries to Machine Learning concepts. Considering the
complexity of IP networks, the wide range of topics have been investigated in the
research literature for application identification in IP based networks.
This research conveyed without forgetting the complexity of IP networks today,
however, always appreciated the simplicity factor. Considering the loads on the cur-
rent network devices, simple and efficient algorithms are always valuable for any kind
of computational process.
Bearing these factors in mind the following scope of research study and analysis
was taken throughout this research,
• VoIP architecture and its future implementations
• IPSec protocol suite with its protocol characteristics
• VoIP and IPSec combined
The affect of a VoIP call inside an IPSec tunnel (e.g. Delay, Jitter, MOS
analysis)
• Background research of application identification in IP networks.
Understanding traditional techniques and their shortcomings for modern
networks.
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Study of innovative techniques proposed in literature (e.g. Early statistical
techniques, Machine Learning, etc.) and their detailed discussions of applica-
bility and portability.
• Considering the lack of real application proposals, designing a software archi-
tecture with the features of
Integrability
Accessibility
Portability
• Algorithm proposal and testing within a real network
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this research was to design a novel software for a system such that it
can be easily implemented and integrated into an existing software architecture such
as the Linux Firewall Framework–Netfilter, which can potentially perform Voice over
IP traffic classification and prioritization in an IPsec tunnel. This purpose has the
following potential outcomes,
• Easy integration for quick and painless VoIP classification in any kind of net-
work.
The proposed system can be used as a Linux proxy server for VoIP priori-
tization without any vendor dependency.
• The source code is completely portable to any Linux based system.
A potential vendor can grab the code and deploy it to any Linux based
firewall or proxy system.
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• Thanks to Linux based software architecture, the proposed code can easily be
extended for future research and practical applications.
1.3 Definition of Chapters
In order to set the stage, Chapter 2 defines and discusses the current trends in IP
Classification for IP Networks. Attention was given to the literature review to obtain
relevant information and research directions. A wide range of topics such as Voice over
IP protocol and its components, IPSec protocol and its features and current literature
review with relevant discussions and shortcomings can be found in Chapter 2. Chapter
3 introduces the key research questions that made this thesis possible. Chapter 4
reveals the proposed architecture for VoIP classification in IPSec tunnels and describes
the software framework used. Experimental results and relevant discussion can be
found in Chapter 5. The final chapter, Chapter 6, concludes this thesis with research
outcomes obtained and discusses future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter starts by introducing key concepts related to the identification fo VoIP
in IPSec tunnels and then discusses current research in this area.
For better understanding and to construct relevance among concepts, a general
discussion of Voice over IP (VoIP) protocol and its current and future use in corporate
and small networks is discussed. Understanding VoIP architecture and its components
is quite critical, since the proposed system in this thesis is directly related to VoIP
packet structure. For instance, VoIP packet flow is directly proportional to the codec
type used in a VoIP session. One of the main components of VoIP systems are the
underlying signaling system. The widely used H.323 and SIP signaling protocols are
also discussed to emphasize their affects on a VoIP call.
Following an introduction to VoIP and its relevant components, the IP Security
(IPSec) protocol stack is discussed in detail. Discussion of the IPSec protocol suite
and how packets are encapsulated in a given IPSec tunnel is quite important to
understand if any type traffic can be identified within a tunnel. Review of both
VoIP and IPSec protocol suites lead to current Traffic Classification schemes in IP
networks.
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Traffic Classification in general is a very wide topic to discuss in a research thesis
like this, however, for simplification it is divided into three sub chapters of Traffic
Classification for network management, traditional techniques and statistical tech-
niques.
As network components converged, many devices are working collectively to create
better efficiency. For instance a WAN proxy device can do packet classification and
increase the network performance by creating adequate QoS measures. In order to
investigate available packet inspection techniques and their general use for network
management this chapter includes an introduction to WAN optimization devices and
traffic policing and shaping.
The field of artificial intelligence can be being applied to many different fields
in today’s technology. A part of this field, machine learning is quite popular among
researchers for creating better traffic classifiers for IP networks. The Machine learning
section provides an introduction to this field and discusses short comings and possible
advantages of using such systems.
The final sections of this chapter discusses the current research efforts on traffic
classification in IP networks. Both traditional techniques and recent popular tech-
niques are discussed in detail including the relevance to VoIP classification in IPSec
tunnels. This chapter ends with a general discussion of current network manage-
ment needs and applicability of current research for VoIP classification in tunneled
networks.
2.1 A Short Introduction to VoIP
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a general description of transmission technolo-
gies for delivery of voice data over IP networks. It is an alternative to traditional
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voice data transmission over public switched telephone networks. Not being a new
technology, VoIP applications and software have been used by many users all over
the world.
The basic principle of VoIP is very simple. It is the same technology that is
used already to listen to music over the Internet. Voice sounds are picked up by a
microphone and digitized by the sound card. The sounds are then converted to a
compressed form, compact enough to be sent in real time over the Internet, using
different codecs. The term codec is short for ”encoder/decoder”. The sounds are
encoded at the sending end, sent over the Internet and then decoded at the receiving
end, where they are played back over the speakers. The only requirements are a
connection between the two computers of an adequate speed, and matching codecs
at each end.
A VoIP system also needs a method for establishing and managing a connection,
for example, calling the other computer, finding out if they accept the call, and closing
the connection when a user hangs up. Because VoIP allows two way communication,
and even conference calls, it’s a lot more complicated than simple audio streaming.
How calls are managed is the area in which VoIP systems fundamentally differ, and
two VoIP users must be using the same system (or compatible ones) in order to be
able to call each other.
Since most of the Internet users do not have a public address, VoIP systems do not
generally work by calling another computer direct although that may be an option
for those who do have a permanent IP address. Instead, each user of the service
registers with an intermediate server or a proxy server, which maintains a record of
their IP address all the time they are connected. Diagram (See Fig. 2.1) demonstrates
a simple VoIP network with a PSTN and a connection to a mobile network.
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Figure 2.1 A basic VoIP diagram showing different connection types.
2.1.1 Benefits of Voice over IP
One of the main benefits of transmission voice over networks is the capability of
converging data and voice networks together. Since VoIP implementations and its
basic protocol implementation is designed to be completely compatible with TCP/IP
layers, there is no need for creating a new infrastructure for VoIP implementations in
networks.
The overall cost of VoIP is much less than regular PSTN networks. This is mainly
because the way Internet is billed compared to regular phone calls. While regular
telephone calls are billed by the minute or second, VoIP calls are billed per megabyte
(MB). In other words, VoIP calls are billed per amount of information (data) sent
over the Internet and not according to the time connected to the telephone network.
In practice the amount charged for the data transferred in a given period is far less
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than that charged for the amount of time connected on a regular telephone line.
VoIP is more flexible compared to PSTN networks. For example, the ability to
transmit more than one telephone call over a single broadband connection without
the need to add extra lines [2] is a clear advantage of VoIP over PSTN. Integration
with other services available over the Internet, including video conversation, message
or data file exchange during the conversation, audio conferencing, managing address
books, and passing information about whether other people are available to interested
parties are also possible with VoIP.
2.1.2 VoIP Standards
Although the basic requirements of a VoIP system are quite simple, real-world im-
plementations are quite complex. VoIP systems in widespread use today fall into
three groups: systems using the H.323 protocol, systems using the SIP protocol, and
systems that use proprietary protocols.
2.1.2.1 H.323
H.323 [3] is a standard for teleconferencing that was developed by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). It supports full multimedia audio, video and data
transmission between groups of two or more participants, and it is designed to support
large networks. H.323 is network-independent: it can be used over networks using
transport protocols other than TCP/IP. H.323 is still a very important protocol, but
it has fallen out of use for consumer VoIP products due to the fact that it is difficult
to make it work through firewalls that are designed to protect computers running
many different applications. It is a system best suited to large organizations that
possess the technical skills to overcome these problems. As a solution for a home or
small office telephony system it is best avoided.
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2.1.2.2 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) stan-
dard signaling protocol for teleconferencing, telephony, presence and event notification
and instant messaging. It provides a mechanism for setting up and managing connec-
tions, but not for transporting the audio or video data. It is probably now the most
widely used protocol for managing Internet telephony. Like all IETF protocols, SIP
is defined in a number of RFCs (Request For Comments the standards documents
that define Internet standard protocols) principally RFC 3261 [4].
A SIP-based VoIP implementation may send the encoded voice data over the net-
work in a number of ways. Most implementations use Real-time Transport Protocol
(RTP), which is defined in RFC 3550 [5]. Both SIP and RTP are implemented on
UDP which, as a connectionless protocol, can cause difficulties with certain types of
routers and firewalls. Usable SIP phones therefore also need to use STUN [6] (for
Simple Traversal of UDP over NAT), a protocol defined in RFC 3489 that allows a
client behind a NAT router to find out its external IP address and the type of NAT
device. Thanks to STUN, setting up SIP-based VoIP hardware or software behind a
home or small office firewall should be a simple affair, but in practice it can still be
problematic.
2.1.3 VoIP Codecs
Codecs are software drivers that are used to encode the speech in a compact enough
form that they can be sent in real time across the Internet using the bandwidth
available. Codecs are not something that VoIP users normally need to worry about,
as the VoIP clients at each end of the connection negotiate between them which one
to use.
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VoIP software or hardware may offer the option to specify a number of codecs.
This allows a choice between voice quality and network bandwidth usage, which might
be necessary to allow multiple simultaneous calls to be held using an ordinary broad-
band connection. The selection is unlikely to make any noticeable difference when
talking to PSTN users, because the lowest bandwidth part of the connection will al-
ways limit the quality achievable, but VoIP-to-VoIP calls using a broadband Internet
connection are capable of delivering much better quality than the plain old telephone
system. Following table shows the important codecs used in VoIP implementations.
Codec Algorithm Bit Rate
(Kbits/s)
Bandwidth
(Kbits/s)
G.711 Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) 64 87.2
G.722 Adaptive Pulse Code Modulation (APCM) 48 66.8
G.726 Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modula-
tion (ADPCM)
32 55.2
G.728 Low-Delay Code Excited Linear Predication
(LD-CELP)
16 31.5
iLBC Internet Low Bit rate Coded (iLBC) 15 27.7
GSM Regular Pulse Excited (RPE) 13 30.1
2.1.4 VoIP Packet Sizes and Frequencies
VoIP packet sizes and frequencies hold valuable information about how VoIP can be
filtered from other type of traffic. Based on the codec bit rate (i.e.the number of bits
per second that need to be transmitted to deliver a voice call.) the packet size and
frequency of each VoIP packet can be calculated and this information can be used to
differentiate VoIP traffic from others.
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Figure 2.2 IPSec Packet Structure
A Cisco whitepaper [7] shows how to calculate VoIP packet sizes and frequencies
in detail. For instance, G.711 codec has 50 pps (i.e. packets per second) value with a
Voice payload size of 160 bytes. For the purposes of this thesis, we can safely assume
the Voice payload sizes range between 20-160 bytes (i.e. without the overhead from
layer 2 or transport layer) and packet frequencies are either 33.3 or 50 pps.
2.2 IPSec Protocol
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a protocol suite for securing Internet Protocol
(IP) communications by authenticating and encrypting each IP packet of a data
stream. IPsec also includes protocols for establishing mutual authentication between
agents at the beginning of the session and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used
during the session. IPsec can be used to protect data flows between a pair of hosts
(e.g. computer users or servers), between a pair of security gateways (e.g. routers or
firewalls), or between a security gateway and a host. For the purpose of this thesis
IPSec protocol suite discussed is concerned with IPv4 networks. All technological
overview and discussions are based on IPv4 based networks. Figure 2.2 shows the
basic structure of an IPsec packet with relevant protocol fields.
The evaluation and analysis of IKE protocol take place to give background infor-
mation about the IPsec protocol suite. Since IKE is one of the fundamental protocols
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that IPSec uses, it is discussed but the detailed analysis is left for further reading.
The relevant protocols to this thesis are AH and ESP protocols which are considered
in a more detailed fashion compared to IKE.
IPSec consists of three major protocols:
• AH Authentication Header protocol provides data origin authentication, data
integrity, and replay protection.
• ESP Encapsulating Security Payload protocol provides the same service as AH
but also provides data privacy by using encryption.
• IKE Internet Key Exchange protocol provides the critical key-management
functionality to IPSec. Alternatively manual keying can be also be used which
is also fully supported by IPsec.
AH and ESP can be operated in one of the two available modes. The choice of
these modes will determine the encapsulation type as well. The available two modes
are
• Transport Mode A method of providing security to the upper-layer protocol
of an IP datagram.
• Tunnel Mode A method of providing security to entire IP datagram.
2.2.1 Authentication Header Protocol (AH)
The AH protocol is specified in RFC 2402 [8]. AH protocol provides datagram-origin
authentication, data integrity, and protection from replay attacks. The authentica-
tion and integrity services are provided by calculation cryptographic MAC, called an
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Figure 2.3 AH Packet Structure
Figure 2.4 ESP Packet Structure
integrity check value (ICV), over a datagram’s payload and parts of the datagram’s
IP header. Because the source and destination fields of the IP header are included
in the MAC, it is impossible to change/modify the contents of those field while the
datagram is in transit. Because the payload also included in the MAC, it can not be
modified while in transit as well. Figure 2.3 shows the packet structure of AH.
2.2.2 Encapsulating Security Payload Protocol (ESP)
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol provided the same authentica-
tion, data integrity, and anti-replay protection that AH provides but adds the IPSec
confidentiality function. In tunnel mode, ESP also provides limited protection from
traffic analysis. The ESP specification is defined in RFC 2406 [9].
Except for the data authenticated and the placement of the authentication data
in the packet, the ESP authentication function is identical to that in AH. Figure 2.4
shows the packet structure of ESP.
2.2 IPSec Protocol 17
2.2.3 Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is the final leg of IPSec protocol suite. It
handles the difficult problem of key management by negotiating security associations
between a set of peers. The IKE protocol specification is defined in RFC 2409 [10].
The basic idea of IKE is to perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange to obtain a shared
secret that is used to generate keying material for the encryption and authentication
algorithms between peers. In addition to exchanging keying material, IKE negotiates
the encryption, authentication, and other cryptographic primitives that the VPN
needs and agrees on the policy that the VPN will use, so the protocol needs to handle
these aspects of security association as well.
IKE is often described as a hybrid protocol because it derives from three other
key-exchange protocols. IKE uses the first of these, the Internet Security and Key
Management Protocol (ISAKMP), as a base protocol in much the same way as FTP,
uses TCP. ISAKMP is a framework that provides mechanisms and message formats
for expressing additional protocols that establish security associations and perform
key exchange. ISAKMP is defined in RFC 2408 [11].
The Oakley Key Determination Protocol (OAKLEY) describes a series of modes
that specify methods for using Diffie-Hellam algorithm to securely exchange keying
material while providing identity verification, authentication, and perfect forward
secrecy.The OAKLEY protocol is defined in RFC [12].
The SKEME protocol [13] is a versatile key-exhange protocol that provides perfect
forward secrecy, key replacement, and the negotiation of cryptographic primitives.
SKEME can also provide endpoint anonymity and repeatability. IKE uses SKEME’s
method of using public key encryption for authentication and the idea of the fast
re-keying by exchanging nonces.
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Figure 2.5 IPSec Transport Mode
2.2.4 IPSec Modes
Authentication Header and Encapsulating Security Payload protocols can operate
in either transport mode or tunnel mode. Understanding differences between these
modes crucial since from a technical point of view, the two modes differ in how they
encapsulate the data and thus in what they protect. From an operational point of
view, they differ in whether they are protecting communications between two hosts or
protecting communications between two networks or between a host and a network.
2.2.4.1 Transport Mode
Transport mode is designed to be used between two fixed hosts or when the VPN
endpoints are the final destinations of the traffic in the VPN. Transport port cannot
be used to connect two networks or a network and a host. Figure 2.5 illustrates the
IPSec Transport mode.
Transport mode gets its name from the fact that transport-mode VPNs protect
the transport-layer data in the datagram. This implies that AH or ESP header is
placed after the IP header in the datagram. In the case of AH, of course, there is no
trailer field. (see Fig. 2.3 and 2.4)
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Figure 2.6 IPSec Tunnel Mode
Packet structures in figures 2.3 and 2.4 show why transport mode can only be
used between two endpoints where the endpoints have to be final destinations. Since
there is only one IP header in the packet, the destination of this packet has to be
final destination.
Although it seems like a limited implementation, the end-to-end security feature
allows transport to be the choice for peer-to-peer or client-to-server implementations.
2.2.4.2 Tunnel Mode
The other available mode that AH and ESP can operate is the tunnel mode. This
method is more flexible than transport model but it requires more bandwidth due to
increased processing.
The typical use of tunnel mode is to connect either two networks together or a
host and a network. Figure 2.6 shows an example of this scenario. Note that in
tunnel mode access to destination is through a security gateway. AH and ESP packet
structures when tunnel mode used can be seen from figures 2.7 and 2.8.
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Figure 2.7 ESP Tunnel Mode Packet Structure
Figure 2.8 AH Tunnel Mode Packet Structure
2.2.5 IPSec & VoIP
Given preceding discussion of IPsec architecture, there are some issues arising about
VoIP and IPSec combined or VoIPSec in short. According a publication by Cisco [14],
when IPSec used as a security measure for VoIP traffic the overhead introduced by
IPsec is about 40 bytes which in result increases the required bandwidth from 9 kbps
to 40 kbps compared clear text voice transmission.
Also according to a report by NIST (U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology) [15] the need for VoIP security is the following:
“The prevalence and ease of packet sniffing and other techniques for capturing
packets on an IP based network makes encryption a necessity for VOIP. Security in
VOIP is concerned both with protecting what a person says as well as to whom the
person is speaking. IPsec can be used to achieve both of these goals as long as it is
applied with ESP using the tunnel method. This secures the identities of both the
endpoints and protects the voice data from prohibited users once packets leave the
corporate intranet.”
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According to a 2002 study by researchers at the University of Milan [16] the
following difficulties are arising from VoIPSec:
• Encryption / Decryption Latency
• Scheduling and the Lack of QoS in the Crypto-Engine
• Expanded Packet Size
• IPsec and NAT Incompatibility
It is clear that IPSec is the optimum solution for enchanced security for critical
VoIP conversations, however, due overhead and other reasons QoS rules become un-
usable in most cases for VoIP. Therefore, timely, accurate and fast identification of
VoIP packets in peer-to-peer tunneled networks is essential for better QoS.
2.3 Traffic Classification in IP Networks
This section starts with a general discussion of Traffic Classification in IP Networks.
Quality of Service (QoS) and traffic policing versus traffic shaping are discussed in
detail.
Traffic shaping or classification can be defined as the control of computer network
traffic in order to optimize or guarantee performance, decrease overall latency, and/or
increase usable bandwidth by delaying packets that meet certain criteria [17]. More
specifically, traffic shaping is any action on a set of packets (often called a stream or
a flow) which imposes additional delay on those packets such that they conform to
some predetermined constraint which can be a contract or traffic profile [18].
Traffic shaping is sometimes applied by traffic sources to ensure the traffic they
send complies with a contract which may be enforced in the network by a policing
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network device. Alternatively, traffic shaping can occur at any point in the network
to satisfy corporate rules.
2.3.1 Quality of Service (QoS)
Quality of service is the ability to provide different priority to different applications,
users, or data flows, or to guarantee a certain level of performance to a data flow.
For example, a required bit rate, delay, jitter, packet dropping probability and/or
bit error rate may be guaranteed. Quality of service guarantees are important if
the network capacity is insufficient, especially for real-time streaming multimedia
applications such as Voice over IP, online games and IP-TV, since these often require
fixed bit rate and are delay sensitive, and in networks where the capacity is a limited
resource, for example in cellular data communication [19].
QoS implementations require the management of key qualities of traffic such as;
throughput, packet drop rate, delay, jitter and bit-rate-error. For instance in the
case of throughput, when varying load from other users sharing the same network
resources the bit-rate (the maximum throughput) that can be provided to a certain
data stream may be too low for real-time multimedia services if all data streams get
the same scheduling priority. In the case delay it might take a long time for each
packet to reach its destination, because it gets held up in long queues, or takes a less
direct route to avoid congestion. This is different from throughput, as the delay can
build up over time, even if the throughput is almost normal. In some cases, excessive
delay can render an application such as VoIP or online gaming unusable. Finally
the affect of jitter can be explained as follows, packets from the source will reach
the destination with different delays. A packet’s delay varies with its position in the
queues of the routers along the path between source and destination and this position
can vary unpredictably. This variation in delay is known as jitter and can seriously
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affect the quality of streaming audio and/or video.
The next section reveals the one of the key features of QoS implementations, traffic
policing and traffic shaping and the differences between them.
2.3.2 Policing vs. Shaping
At a first glance imposing policies to a given traffic seems similar to shaping the
traffic, but traffic shaping and policy enforcement have distinct differences. One
of the Cisco white-papers defines the differences between policing and shaping with
the following, “Traffic policing propagates bursts. When the traffic rate reaches the
configured maximum rate, excess traffic is dropped (or remarked). The result is an
output rate that appears as a saw-tooth with crests and troughs. In contrast to policing,
traffic shaping retains excess packets in a queue and then schedules the excess for later
transmission over increments of time. The result of traffic shaping is a smoothed
packet output rate.” [20] Diagram (See Fig. 2.9) shows the basic difference between
policing and shaping.
In the case of shaping, the obvious assumptions is to have sufficient memory to
buffer delayed packets, while police does not.
Diagrams (See Fig. 2.10, 2.11) illustrates the Cisco implementation of the shaping
and policing. The next section identifies the necessity for traffic classification and
describes some aspects of classification from a network management point of view.
2.3.3 The Need for Traffic Classification
From a basic network management point of view traffic classification is needed to
better understand the behavior of a given network. For instance an ISP (Internet
Service Provider) would benefit from traffic classification by seeing which subscribers
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Figure 2.9 Difference between Policing and Shaping
Figure 2.10 Cisco Traffic Policing Implementation
Figure 2.11 Cisco Traffic Shaping Implementation
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Figure 2.12 A Network Using a Proxy Device
are doing what on their network and can target services to the subscriber base they
have attracted. Another example can be given from education sector. A university
network should be secure, robust and fast for better servicing to students, researchers
and administration units. These basic needs imposes great pressure on networks. To
overcome these issues university type networks usually use proxy devices and a DMZ.
to control their networks. Therefore, for a university it is essential to see what type
of traffic is passing through their network at a given time. Figure 2.12 illustrates a
simple network using a proxy server.
Intelligently managed, traffic shaping as distinct from policing improves the net-
work latency, service availability and bandwidth utilization without any drawback
(theoretically).
The next section identifies an important concept in traffic classification techniques
the WAN optimization. This method has been quite favorite one for most of the
vendors such as Cisco, Riverbed etc. for performance increase in WAN networks.
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2.3.4 WAN Optimization
This section describes one of the main practices of traffic classification in contempo-
rary networks. The purpose Wide Area Network (WAN) optimization is to accelerate
a broad range of applications accessed by distributed enterprise users by eliminating
redundant transmissions, staging data in local caches, compressing and prioritizing
data, and streamlining chatty protocols.
WAN optimization techniques are various and vendors claim to have unique prac-
tices for better optimization [21]. However, most of the techniques are similar at
a fundamental level. The differences comes from the monitoring capability, the way
that the products integrate with the network, security and reportingcapabilities. Most
common techniques can be listed as follows;
• Deduplication eliminates the transfer of redundant data across the WAN by
sending references instead of the actual data. By working at the byte level,
benefits are achieved across IP applications [22].
• Compression relies on data patterns that can be represented more efficiently.
These techniques are best suited for point to point leased lines.
• Caching/Proxy relies on human behavior, accessing the same data over and
over. These techniques are best suited for point to point leased lines, but also
viable for Internet Connections and VPN tunnels. Effective use of web caching
typically sees a bandwidth reduction of 15-30% on WAN links [22].
• Protocol spoofing bundles multiple requests from chatty applications into
one. These techniques are best suited for Point to Point WAN links.
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• Traffic shaping controls data usage based on spotting specific patterns in the
data and allowing or disallowing specific traffic. This technique is best suited
for both point to point leased lines and Internet connections. May be hard to
keep current with ever expanding types of applications.
• Equalizing makes assumptions on what needs immediate priority based on the
data usage. Excellent choice for wide open unregulated Internet connections and
clogged VPN tunnels.
• Connection Limits prevents access gridlock in routers and access points due
to denial of service or peer to peer connections. Best suited for wide open
Internet access links, can also be used on WAN links.
• Simple Rate Limits prevents one user from getting more than a fixed amount
of data. This technique is best suited as a stop gap first effort for a remedying
a congested Internet or WAN link.
As an example WAN optimization system, Cisco Systems WAN optimization so-
lution uses four stages of optimization. The first stage is the monitoring the existing
network, the next stage is the classification, the third stage is optimization and final
stage is control. Figure 2.13 shows the Cisco WAN optimization framework [20].
The classification scheme that Cisco uses divided into two main components. The
first component is the payload based classification the second method is the statistical
analysis method. Figure 2.14 shows the Cisco WAN classification framework [20]. As
seen from the figure Ciscouses protocol based identification, access control lists, deep
packet inspection and statistical analysis in a combined fashion to identify unknown
traffic and implement better optimization.
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Figure 2.13 Cisco WAN Optimization Framework
Figure 2.14 Cisco Classification Framework
2.3 Traffic Classification in IP Networks 29
Following section starts with the analysis the of traditional research efforts up to
date for traffic classification in IP networks. Research work done for unencrypted &
encrypted traffic classification methods are discussed.
2.3.5 Traditional Techniques
Traditionally traffic classification is achieved by packet inspection. Packets are an-
alyzed from their headers or payloads. However, information extracted from packet
headers can be misleading. For example, emerging applications use random port
numbers instead of using standard ports [23]. Some application types can reuse stan-
dard ports, such the web browsing ports, for their own purposes. As the number of
application types increase, algorithms used to identify packet payloads become more
complex and the trade-off between computational complexity and accuracy becomes
an issue.
Encrypted traffic packet inspection is quite difficult since the only obvious avail-
able parameters are packet lengths and inter-packet arrival times. These two pa-
rameters led the research community to study statistics of traffic flows rather than
network specific or application specific properties of packets. Research efforts up to
date showed that where the traffic flow is unencrypted, using just packet length and
inter-arrival time allows traffic classification to achieve high accuracy when Machine
Learning (ML) algorithms are used. Although quite relevant to recent networks,
streaming traffic such as VoIP and Video over IP in encrypted tunnels have not yet
been investigated thoroughly.
Most corporate networks employ Voice over IP systems as well as Video Con-
ferencing and use VPN to secure the packets from intruders. VPNs are commonly
used instead of leasing expensive dedicated lines but in terms of network manage-
ment. VPN management is quite challenging, a VPN may be used to disguise large
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downloads or other forms of traffic that would normally be banned by enterprise
policies as enforced by proxy servers, network optimizers, or other network devices.
Successful monitoring and classifying of VPN traffic is thus quite critical to network
management.
2.3.6 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a scientific discipline that is concerned with the design and de-
velopment of algorithms that allow computers to evolve behaviors based on empirical
data, such as from sensor data or databases. A major focus of machine learning re-
search is to automatically learn to recognize complex patterns and make intelligent
decisions based on data; the difficulty lies in the fact that the set of all possible be-
haviors given all possible inputs is too complex to describe generally in programming
languages, so that in effect programs must automatically describe programs [24].
The definition of Machine Learning is the following. A computer program is said
to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance
measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experi-
ence E [24]. In general, Machine Learning techniques tries to find out a mathematical
equation or (function) from the training data. The purpose is to mimic the training
data behavior using statistical techniques.
The computational analysis of machine learning algorithms and their performance
is a branch of theoretical computer science known as computational learning theory.
Because training sets are finite and the future is uncertain, learning theory usually
does not yield absolute guaranties of the performance of algorithms. Instead, proba-
bilistic bounds on the performance are quite common.
This section will first outline supervised and clustering learning, then discuss ther
application to network traffic identification.
2.3 Traffic Classification in IP Networks 31
2.3.6.1 Supervised Learning
Supervised learning is a machine learning technique for deducing a function from
training data. The training data consist of pairs of input objects (typically vectors),
and desired outputs. The output of the function can be a continuous value (called
regression), or can predict a class label of the input object (called classification).
The task of the supervised learner is to predict the value of the function for any
valid input object after having seen a number of training examples (i.e. pairs of input
and target output). To achieve this, the learner has to generalize from the presented
data to unseen situations in a reasonable way [25].
In order to solve a specific supervised learning problem (e.g learning to recognize
handwriting) following steps should be taken [25];
1. Determine the type of training examples. Before doing anything else, the engi-
neer should decide what kind of data is to be used as an example. For instance,
this might be a single handwritten character, an entire handwritten word, or
an entire line of handwriting.
2. Gathering a training set. The training set needs to be characteristic of the
real-world use of the function. Thus, a set of input objects is gathered and
corresponding outputs are also gathered, either from human experts or from
measurements.
3. Determine the input feature representation of the learned function. The accu-
racy of the learned function depends strongly on how the input object is repre-
sented. Typically, the input object is transformed into a feature vector, which
contains a number of features that are descriptive of the object. The number
of features should not be too large, because of the curse of dimensionality; but
should be large enough to accurately predict the output.
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4. Determine the structure of the learned function and corresponding learning al-
gorithm. For example, the engineer may choose to use artificial neural networks
or decision trees.
5. Complete the design. The engineer then runs the learning algorithm on the
gathered training set. Parameters of the learning algorithm may be adjusted
by optimizing performance on a subset (called a validation set) of the training
set, or via cross-validation. After parameter adjustment and learning, the per-
formance of the algorithm may be measured on a test set that is separate from
the training set.
Inductive machine learning is the process of learning a set of rules from instances
(examples in a training set), or more generally speaking, creating a classifier that can
be used to generalize from new instances. The process of applying supervised ML to
a real-world problem is described in Figure 2.15 [25].
The first step is collecting the data-set. If a requisite expert is available, then
the expert could suggest which fields (attributes, features) are the most informative.
If not, then the simplest method is that of brute-force, which means measuring ev-
erything available in the hope that the right (informative, relevant) features can be
isolated.
The second step is the data preparation and data pre-processing. Depending
on the circumstances,researchers have a number of methods to choose from to han-
dle missing data [26]. There are various methods available which are included in
the work by Hodge and Austin [27] a survey of contemporary techniques for outlier
(noise) detection.These researchers have identified the techniques advantages and dis-
advantages. Instance selection is not only used to handle noise but to cope with the
infeasibility of learning from very large data-sets.
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Figure 2.15 Supervised Learning Approach
Instance selection in these data-sets is an optimization problem that attempts
to maintain the mining quality while minimizing the sample size [28]. It reduces
data and enables a data mining algorithm to function and work effectively with very
large data-sets. There is a variety of procedures for sampling instances from a large
data-set [29].
2.3.6.2 Clustering Learning
Cluster analysis is the organization of a collection of patterns (usually represented as
a vector of measurements, or a point in a multidimensional space) into clusters based
on similarity.
Intuitively, patterns within a valid cluster are more similar to each other than they
are to a pattern belonging to a different cluster. An example of clustering is depicted
in Figure 2.16 [30]. The input patterns are shown in Figure 2.16(a), and the desired
clusters are shown in Figure 2.16(b). Here, points belonging to the same cluster are
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Figure 2.16 Data Clustering Example
given the same label [30].
In clustering, the problem is to group a given collection of unlabeled patterns into
meaningful clusters. In a sense, labels are associated with clusters also, but these
category labels are data driven; that is, they are obtained solely from the data.
Clustering is useful in several exploratory pattern-analysis, grouping, decision-
making, and machine-learning situations, including data mining, document retrieval,
image segmentation, and pattern classification. However, in many such problems,
there is little prior information (e.g., statistical models) available about the data, and
the decision-maker must make as few assumptions about the data as possible. It is
under these restrictions that clustering methodology is particularly appropriate for
the exploration of interrelationships among the data points to make an assessment
(perhaps preliminary) of their structure.
Typically a pattern clustering activity involves the following steps which are de-
fined in [31].
1. pattern representation (optionally including feature extraction and/or selec-
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Figure 2.17 Procedures in Data Clustering
tion),
2. definition of a pattern proximity measure appropriate to the data domain,
3. clustering or grouping,
4. data abstraction (if needed), and
5. assessment of output (if needed).
Figure 2.17 depicts a typical sequencing of the first three of these steps, including
a feedback path where the grouping process output could affect subsequent feature
extraction and similarity computations.
2.3.6.3 Machine Learning and Traffic Classification
Machine Learning has been widely accepted method for traffic classification in IP
Networks. This section analyzes the research done and discusses the drawbacks of
Machine Learning approaches.
A promising method is provided by Crotti et al [23], where supervised learning
used with three extractable properties of IP packets; packet length, inter-arrival time
and order of arrival. They used so called protocol fingerprints which are extracted
from PDF vectors. Upon constructing the PDF vectors, they used anomaly scores
from 0 to 1 in order to probabilistically estimate which incoming flow can be classified
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for a given PDF vector. Results show that with 91% accuracy they can identify HTTP,
SMTP and POP3 protocols. Although promising, they have not addressed the issue
of packet loss and jitter in their experiments. For applications like VoIP packet loss
and jitter is quite critical. They also used HTTP as an application in which many
new arising application types can be hidden. They also assumed that starting point
of the flows can be caught, in the case of online deployment there is always a case of
missing the beginning of the flows. Such capture may not be possible outside a VPN.
A supervised approach used by Li [32] uses the C4.5 [33] decision algorithm They
categorized the Internet flow using classes such as web-browsing, mail, bulk ftp, at-
tack, peer-to-peer, database, service, and interactive. They achieved 99% accuracy
using 1875 flows as a training set. They also addressed the issue of accuracy versus
complexity. Although mentioned there is no data available for VPN traffic in their
paper.
In 2005 Moore [34] used Naive Bayes technique to classify application types. They
used hand-classified data to be certain of categories. They also gathered various
feature sets such as flow length, port number, inter-arrival time etc. However, authors
made the assumption that features such as port number is available which would not
be the case in tunneled streams. Also, pre-classified traffic can be misleading since
traffic patterns can change dramatically in time. Their Internet traffic classifications
include bulk data, p2p, database, interactive, WWW, e-mail, games and multimedia.
They maintained 95% overall accuracy using Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF)
methods. However, this method is not suitable for VPN traffic classification.
All mentioned supervised machine learning approaches concentrate on packet type
identification and result in a probabilistic measure that a given packet serves a par-
ticular protocol. Such a probabilistic measure is not of great use within real network
devices. Consider a VoIP stream where 90% of packets were correctly identified, the
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10% misidentified and blocked would render VoIP unusable. Even in an FTP down-
load the recovery from lost packets would be an unwanted addition to the network
traffic.
Clustering has been widely used for application classification. One of the earliest
papers in this area is proposed by McGregor et al. [35], in which application types
such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, IMAP, NTP and DNS are studied. The authors did
not attempt to classify each and every application by itself rather their scheme used
bulk transfer, small transaction and multiple transactions as classification. Therefore
this paper suggested similarity patterns in a given traffic. However, a better classi-
fier should have the capability of decision making which would include accelerating
and/or blocking individual application types such as VoIP. Authors used Expectation
Maximization [36] algorithm for clustering.
One other paper by Zander and Armitage [37], used AutoClass [38] algorithm for
clustering and they studied game traffic, Napster, AOL, HTTP, SMTP, Telnet and
FTP traffic. Their classifier was application specific however; one of the issues about
their proposal was that, given a number of application types their classifier found a
high number of clusters. So, cluster to application mapping was a critical problem
for the efficiency and accuracy of the classifier.
Another attempt using the clustering method was proposed by Bernaille et al
[39], in which the K-means algorithm was employed. The K-means algorithm is a
clustering algorithm which clusters the given data using a distance vector scheme.
Their classifier was TCP based and therefore other transport protocols such as UDP
could not be employed. However, in tunneled networks transport protocol information
is completely invisible. One other drawback of their proposal was the assumption that
the classifier can always get the first few packets of the flow. However, this would not
be the case all the time because in probabilistic methods a packet may be misclassified
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and so miss the start of a transaction. A good classifier should catch the applications
at any time. The study examined FTP, HTTP, Kazaa, NTP, POP3, SMTP, SSH,
HTTPS, POP3S.
One recent paper by Erman et al [40] also used K-means algorithm for clustering
and they studied web, p2p and FTP traffic. In their study they assumed that training
flows can be identifiable from their payload and header information. One other work
by Junior et al [41], just studied p2p traffic and tried to distinguish p2p traffic from
the rest of the application types. Again this work could not be applied to VPN traffic.
Some researchers have studied several application types and some studied only
one type. From the application type prospective we can state that file transfer, web,
e-mail, p2p type protocols have been studied. A few researchers dealt with encrypted
data, however these consist of application level encryption protocols which are tunnels
containing only one protocol and none of the studies deal with network level VPNs
which may contain several protocol types in one tunnel. Such approaches will not suit
peer-to-peer network layer VPNs such as IPsec which may contain several protocols
and anyone time. Also, some assume that start of each flow can be extracted and
some assume that payload and header information can be still used for training phase
of the algorithms. In the most general VPN case no header or payload information
is available for the classifier thus making the proposed approaches irrelevant.
Another interesting paper by Jeffrey et al [42] addresses the issue of mapping from
cluster to application problem. The problem is to map the existing cluster on to the
application type to be classified. If the number of clusters created by the algorithm
is greater than the number of intended application types, classification becomes quite
complicated. To solve this problem the authors fed the clustering algorithm with pre-
labeled flows, which increased the overall performance. However, again they assume
that pre-labeling is available. In VPN tunneled flows we do not have any chance to
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have priori knowledge about the content.
All machine learning approaches fully depend on the training data which may not
always represent the general behavior of network traffic. The mentioned ML methods
only generate a probabilistic measure that a packet serves a given protocol. Again
such a decision is of little use to real network devices.
2.3.6.4 Encrypted Traffic Classification
Regarding encrypted traffic classification, our analysis suggests that most of the work
focuses on either SSH or SSL tunnels. There appear to many challenges and the
accuracy of identification is very low, also while application layer tunnels can hold only
one application per session, network layer tunnels can hold more than one application
per session. For example, Charles et al [43] propose an empirical method based
on hidden Markov models which was applied to simulated HTTPS, SSH and AIM.
tunnels. Application types were identified with only 20% accuracy.
A paper by Bernaille and Teixeira [44] created a model to detect SSL traffic. They
did not include network layer tunneling and assume the ability to analyze the first
few bytes of SSL traffic before encryption which is not possible for traffic put through
a network layer tunnel their proposed accuracy is about 85%.
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood [45] used two supervised machine learning algo-
rithms AdaBoost [46] and RIPPER [47] to detect SSH traffic and classify applications
inside SSH. They showed that it is feasible that SSH type traffic can be detected. How-
ever they only studied a small number of applications and dealt with only application
layer encryption. Application types such as telnet, DNS and FTP are classified with
99% accuracy. However, we could not find classification proposals for delay sensitive
applications such VoIP.
Marc and Neil [48], stated that application types of an encrypted connection using
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HTTP can be inferred. In short the existing work shows that although quite a few
researchers are studying traffic types and encryption we could see little work related
to classification of network layer VPN tunneled protocols and their application types.
Again the identification process results in a probabilistic measure that a packets
serves a particular protocol. Again this kind of statistical information is not usable
by commercial devices such as firewalls or network optimizers.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter the Voice over IP protocol and its components has been analyzed.
The most important component of VoIP protocol suite is the voice codec in use. It is
seen that the nature of the codec would significantly affect the packet transmission
properties. Therefore it is quite critical to understand the differences between codec
types and their affect on traversing packets.
Secondly, the IPSec protocol suite was discussed in detail. The IPsec protocol is
designed such that it can be well integrated into the future of the Internet. Because
of this, it is a complicated protocol suite and it has many different features. For
instance, IPSec allows users to choose AH or ESP type of encapsulation for different
purposes, both AH and ESP supports tunnel and transport mode; in all of these
scenarios VoIP signaling is different and identification process might change case by
case. Therefore, understanding the IPSec protocol and its components is quite critical
for VoIP identification.
Thirdly, this chapter discussed the current classification techniques in real world
implementations and in research. The basics of QoS are defined and WAN optimiza-
tion techniques which increase the performance and QoS for certain applications are
discussed.
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Finally, current research efforts are discussed in detail with a special attention
to Machine Learning. The literature survey done in the early stages of this research
showed that Machine Learning is being used quite often for traffic classification tech-
niques. By nature it is contained in the field of Artificial Intelligence however, it has
a wide range of applications in different fields.
As an overall view on the current literature and real world applications following
comments can be made:
• Devices on the Market Analysis showed that all available devices concen-
trate on identification techniques which can be implemented in non-encrypted
traffic. Port based identification, protocol based identification techniques are
still in use by the vendor implementations. Most devices are using caching ca-
pabilities to ”fast-forward” the traffic back again. Vendor devices can easily be
tricked by simple ssh tunnels from Linux box and traffic recognition becomes
impossible. The expensive bandwidth can be easily wasted.
• Current Literature Literature review showed that traffic identification tech-
niques still concentrated on non-encrypted traffic and found accuracy are barely
useful for real-time applications such as VoIP or Video over IP. The case be-
comes even worse when encrypted traffic is tried to be identified and no pub-
lished technique allowed VoIP to be identified within an IPSec peer-to-peer
tunnel. Although Machine Learning techniques can provide solid future for
this type of traffic identification, by nature these algorithms need huge amount
of processing power even before the identification process starts. As discussed
previously, even a simple supervised ML technique requires huge amount of pre-
classified data. Considering the dynamic nature of Internet, it is almost certain
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that these techniques would not go further from a research effort to a real world
application.
The next chapter reveals the fundamental research directions that made this thesis
possible.
Chapter 3
Research Questions
This chapter introduces the relevant research questions that this thesis aims to answer.
Some important questions to be answered are the following:
• Given the current literature about Traffic Classifiation in IP networks, can the
proposed methods and/or algorithms be applied to real network devices?
This question is one of the most crucial one’s since it draws the boundary
between research and real world. An algorithm without proper applicability
(i.e. computational overhead, memory requirements) to real network devices
would be useless. This thesis tries propose a composite approach which can be
applied to any Linux based system with an average CPU and memory.
• Given the current literature about Traffic Classifiation in IP networks, can the
proposed methods and/or algorithms be applied to IPSec tunneled networks?
The literature survey showed that research methods up to date use statis-
tical properties of network traffic, but are not being applied to IPSec tunneled
scenarios. Although some methods exist for encrypted traffic, these techniques
applied to application layer encryption methods (i.e SSH, SSL). The research in
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this thesis seems to be one of the first approaches to tackle VoIP classification
in IPSec tunneled networks.
• What type of applications should be classified and/or differentiated in an IPSec
tunneled traffic?
Considering the complexity of classfying traffic in an IPSec tunnel, devel-
oping a method to classify any type of traffic would not make sense. Even
if developed, the overhead introduced by the classification scheme itself may
potentially introduce unnecessary delays due to excessive processing. In this
thesis, the proposed technique simple ignores any kind of traffic type but VoIP
which is the most delay and QoS sensitive traffic.
Chapter 4
Proposal & Experimental Analysis
This chapter provides a detailed review of the research work carried out and identifies
the results that are to be analyzed in the next chapter.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the usefulness of classification of VoIP
traffic in tunneled networks and how feasible it is to develop a system which can
easily be integrated into an existing software or hardware platform.
Next, the design of the novel proposed system thoroughly. The basis of proposed
software platform, IPtables framework and its relevant API is discussed and explained.
The next section, concentrates and discusses on the algorithm proposal and its
advantages and disadvantages for integration to currently available platforms used in
corporate networks.
The final section concludes this chapter and discusses the components.
4.1 Classification of VoIP in Tunneled Networks
In this section the usefulness of VoIP identification in tunneled networks will be
discussed and its benefit to network administration explained. The benefits justify
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the effort of trying to identify VoIP in an IPSec tunnel. VoIP implementation is in
great demand for modern networks as it is much cheaper than traditional telephony.
In order to understand clearly why VoIP classification can be useful in tunneled
scenarios consider the following examples;
1. A corporate network where all inside-outside and outside-inside connections are
achieved via a proxy server. Proxy server here, refers a hardware device which
can also be a firewall, WAN optimization device or a packet caching device with
packet filtering and tracking capabilities.
2. Limited bandwidth situations where corporate networks carry significant amount
of applications which uses most of the available bandwidth (e.g. high number
of FTP traffic).
3. Banning tunnels due to corporate policies where all tunneled applications would
be blocked.
All of above scenarios are relevant to contemporary networks. Figure 4.1 shows
a basic network with proxy servers in use. A proxy server acts as an intermediate
device between a client and a destination, usually a server. The advantage of a proxy
server is that it can enforce enterprise policies, enhance security and cache resources
locally and so reduce external traffic.
Although proxy servers increase the security levels by protecting internal hosts
from unknown or unwanted communications they can also be seen as a bottleneck
which can introduce delays and jitter. Therefore, when a VoIP session is tunneled
through a proxy device, identifying VoIP and giving appropriate priority in a timely
manner is critical to maintaining QoS.
Limited bandwidth availability is a major concern for VoIP traffic. While VoIP
adds little to network traffic it can be badly delayed when other protocols make
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Figure 4.1 A Basic Network with Proxy Servers
heavy network demands, for example a large FTP session. With un-encrypted traffic,
traditional packet inspection can give priority to VoIP and slow down FTP and so
maintain an acceptable VoIP QoS. When VoIP is hidden in an encrypted tunnel it
cannot be identified and given priority thus the QoS becomes unacceptable.
Another scenario is where enterprise policy dictates that all tunneled traffic is
banned to ensure a proxy server can properly function. If tunneled traffic is allowed
then it becomes quite trivial to initiate a Bittorent session using a tunnel and so bypass
the proxy. Since Bittorent is a major concern in terms of both network bandwidth
and copyright laws many enterprises would like to stop tunneling but cannot do so
because of the wide spread and legitimate use of peer to peer tunnels for VoIP. If it is
possible to identify VoIP (and other legitimate traffic) within a tunnel then a proxy
server could successfully allow legitimate tunnels and block illegitimate tunnels.
A software implememtation can be useful and successful as long as it is compu-
tationally efficient and can be well integrated into existing hardware platforms. In
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order to achieve this goal, this research proposes a software component which can be
used with Linux IPtables framework to solve VoIP classification in IPSec peer-to-peer
tunnels problem.
4.2 Design
The design of the proposed software is composed of three main features, these are the
IPtables framework, the libnetfilter API and the proposed software which is integrated
into the IPtables for userspace applications.
1. IPTables Framework relies on the netfilter system to enable user space applica-
tions and to process packets. The proposed system was integrated with netfilter
and can be invoked from any Linux distribution which supports IPTables.
2. Netfilter API is the main programming interface for userspace applications, the
developed code was implemented using netfilter API.
Figure 4.2 shows the components of the proposed software and it is integration
with the netfilter framework.
The key VoIP identifier is in userspace therefore it can be easily controlled by a
network administrator and avoids the need for kernel programming.
IPtables has been configured as follows; when a packet comes to the first network
interface of a proxy device it runs through the pre-routing phase where it is decided
whether the packet is going to be modified or any NAT decision be made. After the
routing decision is made it is sent to the FORWARD chain to be put into a QUEUE
chain which invokes the VoIP identifier. This identifier looks at the packet and its
own record of packet history to decide whether or not this packet is most likely a
VoIP packet. A VoIP packet is passed straight through the system whereas anything
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Figure 4.2 Software Design
else is queued for 100ms to give priority to VoIP packets. Clearly more sophisticated
treatment of non-VoIP traffic is possible. The simple delay of 100 ms is adequate to
show the system design is sound.
The fact that there is no kernel level software in the proposed system is quite
advantageous and makes integrating it to any Linux box much easier. Most Linux
based network devices use a Linux kernel with modified modules or modified user
interfaces. Such a system can well be integrated into any vendor firewall or proxy
device available in the market today.
4.2.1 IPTables Framework
IPtables is a user space application program that allows a system administrator to
configure the tables provided by the Linux kernel firewall (implemented as different
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Netfilter modules) and the chains and rules it stores. Different kernel modules and
programs are currently used for different protocols; iptables applies to IPv4, ip6tables
to IPv6, arptables to ARP, and ebtables as a special for Ethernet frames.
IPtables is built on top of netfilter, the packet alteration framework for Linux
2.4.x and 2.6.x. It is a major rewrite of its predecessor ipchains, and is used to
control packet filtering, Network Address Translation (masquerading, portforwarding,
transparent proxying), and special effects such as packet mangling.
4.2.1.1 History
IPtables preserves the basic ideas introduced into Linux with ipfwadm: lists of rules
which each specified what to match within a packet, and what to do with such a
packet. ipchains added the concept of chains of rules, and iptables extended this
further into tables: one table was consulted when deciding whether to NAT a packet,
and another consulted when deciding how to filter a packet. In addition, the three
points at which filtering is done in a packet’s journey were altered, so any packet only
passes through one filtering point.
This split allowed iptables, in turn, to use the information which the connection
tracking layer had determined about a packet: this information was previously tied to
NAT. This makes iptables superior to ipchains because it has the ability to monitor
the state of a connection and redirect, modify or stop data packets based on the state
of the connection, not just on the source, destination or data content of the packet.
(This is done with the -m conntrack match, explained in the manpages.) A firewall
using iptables this way is said to be a stateful firewall versus ipchains, which can
only create a stateless firewall (except in very limited cases). It can be said that
ipchains is not aware of the full context from which a data packet arises, whereas
iptables is, and therefore iptables can make better decisions on the fate of packets
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and connections [49].
4.2.1.2 Operation
Xtables allows the system administrator to define tables containing chains of rules
for the treatment of packets. Each table is associated with a different kind of packet
processing. Packets are processed by sequentially traversing the rules in chains. A
rule in a chain can cause a go to or jump to another chain, and this can be repeated
to whatever level of nesting is desired. (A jump is like a call, i.e. the point that was
jumped from is remembered.) Every network packet arriving at or leaving from the
computer traverses at least one chain.
The origin of the packet determines which chain it traverses initially. There are
five predefined chains (mapping to the five available Netfilter hooks), though a table
may not have all chains. Predefined chains have a policy, for example DROP, which
is applied to the packet if it reaches the end of the chain. The system administrator
can create as many other chains as desired. These chains have no policy; if a packet
reaches the end of the chain it is returned to the chain which called it. A chain may
be empty. The pre-defined chains are as follows;
• PREROUTING Packets will enter this chain before a routing decision is
made.
• INPUT Packet is going to be locally delivered. (N.B.: It does not have any-
thing to do with processes having a socket open. Local delivery is controlled by
the local-delivery routing table: ip route show table local.)
• FORWARD All packets that have been routed and were not for local delivery
will traverse this chain.
• OUTPUT Packets sent from the machine itself will be visiting this chain.
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• POSTROUTING Routing decision has been made. Packets enter this chain
just before handing them off to the hardware.
Each rule in a chain contains the specification of which packets it matches. It may
also contain a target (used for extensions) or verdict (one of the built-in decisions).
As a packet traverses a chain, each rule in turn is examined. If a rule does not match
the packet, the packet is passed to the next rule. If a rule does match the packet, the
rule takes the action indicated by the target/verdict, which may result in the packet
being allowed to continue along the chain or it may not. Matches make up the large
part of rule-sets, as they contain the conditions for which packets are tested. These
can happen for any layer in the OSI model, as with e.g. the –mac-source and -p
tcp –dport parameters, and there are also protocol-independent matches, such as -m
time.
The packet continues to traverse the chain until either
1. a rule matches the packet and decides the ultimate fate of the packet, for ex-
ample by calling one of the ACCEPT or DROP, or a module returning such an
ultimate fate; or
2. a rule calls the RETURN verdict, in which case processing returns to the calling
chain; or
3. the end of the chain is reached; traversal either continues in the parent chain
(as if RETURN was used), or the base chain policy, which is an ultimate fate,
is used.
Targets also return a verdict like ACCEPT (NAT modules will do this) or DROP
(e.g. the “REJECT“ module), but may also imply CONTINUE (e.g. the “LOG“
module; CONTINUE is an internal name) to continue with the next rule as if no
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Figure 4.3 Packet Flow in IPtables
target/verdict was specified at all. Figure 4.3 [49] shows the packet flow paths graph-
ically.
4.2.2 The Netfilter API
Although, the framework of IPtables and netfilter discussed in detail in previous
section, it is worthwile to go more in detail about the netfilter and its API since
the proposed software works on top of this and it is also a very useful tool to create
stateful firewalls. The following discussion regarding netfilter is solely based on a
documentation [50] written by the core creator of netfilter Paul “Rusty” Russell.
Netfilter is a framework for packet mangling, outside the normal Berkeley socket
interface. It has four parts. Firstly, each protocol defines “hooks“ (IPv4 defines 5)
which are well-defined points in a packet’s traversal of that protocol stack. At each
of these points, the protocol will call the netfilter framework with the packet and the
hook number.
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Secondly, parts of the kernel can register to listen to the different hooks for each
protocol. So when a packet is passed to the netfilter framework, it checks to see if
anyone has registered for that protocol and hook; if so, they each get a chance to
examine (and possibly alter) the packet in order, then discard the packet NF DROP,
allow it to pass NF ACCEPT, tell netfilter to forget about the packet NF STOLEN,
or ask netfilter to queue the packet for userspace NF QUEUE.
The third part is that packets that have been queued are collected (by the ip queue
driver) for sending to user-space; these packets are handled asynchronously.
Following figure 4.3, the packets come in having passed the simple sanity checks
(i.e., not truncated, IP checksum OK, not a promiscuous receive), they are passed to
the netfilter framework’s NF IP PRE ROUTING hook.
Next packets enter the routing code, which decides whether the packet is destined
for another interface, or a local process. The routing code may drop packets that are
unroutable.
If it’s destined to pass to another interface instead, the netfilter framework is
called for the NF IP FORWARD hook.
The packet then passes a final netfilter hook, the NF IP POST ROUTING hook,
before being put on the wire again.
The NF IP LOCAL OUT hook is called for packets that are created locally. It
can be seen that routing occurs after this hook is called: in fact, the routing code is
called first (to figure out the source IP address and some IP options).
4.3 Algorithm Proposal
The main aim of this research is to demonstrate that the identification of VoIP will
improve VoIP QoS and may slow down other protocols, even to the stage where other
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(a) Chicago Link (b) San Jose Link
Figure 4.4 Chicago & San Jose OC-192 Links Traffic Distribution
protocols become unusable. This could allow a proxy to ensure that network layer
tunnels carry VoIP but not other traffic. Unless this is demonstrated to be true then
the creation of VoIP detection algorithms for network layer tunnels is a pointless
exercise.
The proposed VoIP algorithm is quite simple in nature by following some realistic
traffic values taken from CAIDA [51–54] data-sets. Figure 4.4 is taken from one of
the largest SONET(Synchronous Optical Networking) links (Equinix Chicago and
San Jose OC-192) in the world. Average load on these links are around 5 Gigabits/s
with a capacity of 10 Gigabits/s [55].
According to the data-sets it is obvious that so called mice flows (i.e. flows which
carry a small number of packets (or bytes) and die out fast) are insignificant compared
to [56, 57] so called elephant flows (i.e. flows which carry a large number of packets
(or bytes) and are persistent in nature).
Below table shows the an overall view of comparison between mice and elephant
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Application Min (%) Average (%) Max (%)
HTTP 38.94 53.23 71.59
UNKOWN TCP 9.46 14.58 22.97
HTTPS 0.86 1.46 2.57
SSH 0.09 0.47 2.75
Table 4.1 Mice & Elephant Flow Analysis
flows according to CAIDA data sets [51–54,56,58].
According to above results, more than 70% of the data passing Chicago OC-192
link is composed of elephant flows. This also proves the point that if elephant flows
can be eliminated or slowed down, VoIP traffic can get sufficient bandwidth for QoS
purposes.
Also according to CAIDA [58] (The Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis), the Internet traffic is widely dominated by TCP, however rise of new type
of applications such as IPTV, PPStream etc.) significantly increased the use of UDP
as a transport protocol.
Using above facts the following simple algorithm was created to initially identify
VoIP traffic in a given flow. Considering [51–54, 56, 58] a simple VoIP detection
and algorithm has been formulated. Very little other network traffic has the packet
length of VoIP traffic, typically in the range of 60 to 160 bytes without the overhead
introduced by IPsec (See section 2.2.5) [56]. If a data packet is within this range it
will be passed through immediately, otherwise it will be delayed to cause non-VoIP
traffic to slow down.
The algorithm below can distinguish the IPSec and non-IPSec packets by looking
at the packet headers as they arrive. If the packet header matches certain criteria
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(i.e. packet size VoIP in IPsec being greater than 200 bytes) the packet will be put
in a queue and next will be checked. The number of in size packets is counted over
a 150ms [56] period. If the number is less than or equal to 10 then the packets are
assumed to be VoIP and pass through without delay. The proposed algorithm can
simply be defined as the following pseudo-code called everytime a packet is received
by the queue.
//Algorithm to prioritize only VoIP in IPSec Tunnels//
define time_in_range ==> 15 ms - 35 ms packet inter-arrival
define size_in_range ==> Payload 100 bytes to 200 bytes
define circular buffer of 20 packets
define delay of 100 ms
Check packet header
IF TCP;
delay;
exit;
IF UDP;
delay;
exit;
IF IPSec;
IF not size_in_range;
delay;
exit;
Save timestamp in circular buffer
IF an old packet is time_in_range;
than pass;
else delay;
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Above algorithm is designed in such a way that the computational overhead is
minimum. This is an important aim as the algorithm may be placed in proxy servers
which are frequently heavily loaded. Another target includes low-end network devices
which are cost sensitive and so must use a low overhead algorithm.
4.4 Experimental Design
In order to test the proposed algorithm several experimental setups have been used.
In the early stages of the research signaling affects of different VoIP codecs were
tested and analyzed. In this analysis process three of the most recognized and used
VoIP codecs SVOP, iLBC and G.729 were tested. Packet length and inter-arrival
time comparison have been done among different bandwidth hungry protocols such
as FTP. The outcome of these analysis can be found int Experimental Results chapter.
The test environment for proposed algorithm composed of three distinct scenarios.
• In the first scenario two host machines are connected through IPSec Tunnel.
• The second scenario uses the same situation but adds 2.5 megabits of random
cross traffic and this is sufficient to seriously stress the proxy system.
• In the third scenario VoIP/non-VoIP detection is turned on and is used to slow
non-VoIP traffic.
In order to understand the affect of IPSec tunnels on VoIP traffic and compare
it among different scenarios a reference experiment was completed with non-IPSec
tunnels. The algorithm performance can also be found in next chapter.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the idea of VoIP classification in a tunneled network was discussed.
Three different scenarios where VoIP identification are relevant and useful were pro-
posed. Following feasibility analysis of VoIP classification, the question of how VoIP
classification can be achieved in tunneled network was answered with a startlingly
simple algorithm and relevant software platform.
The Linux firewall implementation (Netfilter API & IPtables) was analyzed and
proposed to be the platform for the software implementation. Having well defined
features and wide range of support and documentation for this platform was well
fitting with the purpose of this research.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results
In this research the experimental work was composed of two major objectives. The
first objective was to find out the differences between the various VoIP codecs and
their affect on VoIP signaling and packet statistics. The second objective was to test
the efficiency and applicability of the proposed algorithm in a real test-bed where the
traffic is tunneled through two endpoints.
The VoIP Codec analysis section reveals the affects of different codec usage on
VoIP performance and packet properties, three major codecs analyzed and their
packet structure and statistical properties revealed.
Algorithm testing has been completed using two Linux boxes with a proxy server
between them. The two hosts were connected through an IPSec tunnel and tests
completed using different levels of traffic. Results and detailed discussion can be
found in the subsequent sections.
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Codec Mean (bytes) Standard Deviation (bytes) Sampling Freqency
SVOP 156.32 12.47 16 kHz
iLBC 89.49 8.18 8 kHz
G.729 70.96 5.13 8 kHz
Table 5.1 VoIP Codec Analysis
5.1 VoIP Codec Analysis
In order to make a realistic comparison between different codecs of VoIP real Skype
traffic was used because, like all VoIP systems, it has some significant statistical
characteristics which can be identified within several seconds. Available traces of
Skype traffic were obtained from [59]. We analyzed different voice codecs since codec
usage changes the basic statistical structure of the traffic. The table 5.1 shows the
mean and standard deviation of the packet sizes from each available codec as well as
the theoretical sampling frequency.
In figure 5.1, we show graphically the probability distribution and cumulative
probability distribution of SVOP and iLBC codecs in terms of individual packet sizes.
Although different codec usage changes the behavior of packet size distribution, most
packets lie between 50-200 byte length. One other interesting result is that Skype
traffic packet size is normally distributed. Looking at the standard deviations it is
clear that most of the Skype traffic can be gathered if a suitable size window is
applied. To find out the exact percentage of traffic which can be classified we can
employ basic properties of normally distributed samples. Assume that µ is the mean
and σ is the standard deviation of a normal distribution. For any µ and σ, 99.6%
of observations fall within 3σ standard deviation of the mean that is µ + 3σ and µ
− 3σ. Following these fundamental properties we can conclude that for all different
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(a) SVOP Codec (b) iLBC Codec
Figure 5.1 SVOP & iLBC Codec Packet Distribution Analysis
codecs in use it is possible to identify 99.6% of VoIP traffic in the range of 56-194
bytes. In figure 5.2a it is possible to see the overall picture of probability densities of
the codecs we tested. We have also tested the available Skype traces against a FTP
download trace retrieved from our local labs at RMIT university.
In figure 5.2 it possible to see that the density of FTP packets are lying in the
MTU range. This also proves the point that VoIP sessions can be detected when
FTP and HTTP sessions share a network layer tunnel. A more detailed discussion
about why VoIP can be differentiated in the presence of other elephant flows can
be seen in section 4.3 (Algorithm Proposal). It is also important to clarify that
VoIP traffic we tested was using UDP as a transport layer protocol. However, we
acknowledge the fact that Skype traffic can also be transmitted with TCP. Testing
TCP based Skype traffic against other TCP based applications is left as a future
implementation. However, our initial trials showed that although Skype traffic can
be encapsulated in a TCP datagram, due to its signaling properties the size of the
packets would still have distinct statistical properties.
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(a) All Codecs (b) FTP vs. VoIP
Figure 5.2 FTP and VoIP Codec Packet Distribution Differences
5.2 Algorithm Testing
The test bed for the algorithm testing was designed using a simple proxy server which
passes VoIP and other traffic from one host to another.
The test environment examined three distinct scenarios. In the first scenario two
host machines are connected through IPSec and sample VoIP streams were passed
using three different codecs. The second scenario used the same situation but added
2.5 megabits/s of random cross traffic. This was sufficient to seriously stress the
proxy system. In the third scenario VoIP/non-VoIP detection was turned on and is
used to slow non-VoIP traffic. Figure 5.3 shows the setup for algorithm testing. The
Proxy server used was implemented using GNU/Linux Kernel 2.6 with a 1.86 GHz
CPU and 2 Gigabytes of Ram. The proxy device had a standard Gigabit Ethernet
controller however host devices had 100 Mbit Ethernet controllers.
The table 5.2 shows an overall view of the results obtained. Analysis include the
packet size of each codec used, average inter arrival times and affect of cross traffic
and our proxy system. Note that the heavy cross traffic did not just delay VoIP it
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Figure 5.3 Simple Test Bed for Algorithm Testing
Inter Arrival Time (seconds)
Codec No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic Cross Traffic & Proxy Number of Meas.
G.711 0.020 0.030 0.020 1000
G.723 0.038 0.051 0.040 1000
G.729 0.020 0.026 0.021 1000
Table 5.2 Inter Arrival Time Analysis
actually slowed down the rate at which VoIP traffic is sent out of the proxy. For
example 1 second of VoIP traffic on the proxy input would take 1.5 seconds to be
transmitted from the proxy output. This situation mimics a network device which is
in overload and is dropping packets in order to cope with buffer overflow.
Above table suggests that when the cross traffic is introduced inter-arrival times
increase about 50% which is not an acceptable value in a VoIP call. However, the
proxy system successfully decreased the average values to acceptable ranges. Al-
though these values showed the significant improvement in the system, these are only
average values which cannot analyze the change in jitter conditions which is also an
important parameter in VoIP calls. To address that issue a packet analysis for each
codec had been completed.
In the test environment three different codec types G.711, G.723 and G.729 were
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Figure 5.4 Base Test without External Traffic
used for packet analysis. As a base test we sent all traffic from 10.0.1.2 to 10.0.2.2 the
results can be seen in Figure 5.4. It was observed that traffic was quite stable and
average inter arrival times of each observed packet distributed quite homogenously
with low jitter values if the cross traffic does not exist.
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of packets when cross traffic is introduced. It is
obvious that VoIP traffic is distorted with the cross traffic and inter arrival times vary
greatly. As a final test the proxy system prioritized VoIP traffic when cross traffic is
present. In Figure 5.5b it is obvious that the system decreases the distortions in the
packet inter arrival times and prioritize the VoIP traffic. .
Figure 5.6 shows the G.711 codec when there is no cross traffic, when there is cross
traffic and when our proxy system works in the presence of cross traffic. It is observed
that cross traffic increases the distortion greatly and the proxy system significantly
decreases the affect of cross traffic and increases performance.
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(a) Cross Traffic w/out Proxy (b) Proxy Server
Figure 5.5 Comparison between the affects of Cross Traffic and Proxy Sys-
tem
Figure 5.6 Performance of G.711 codec in Test Bed
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The distortion caused by cross traffic and its measurement is not only metric
for VoIP quality analysis. According a whitepaper by Agilent Technologies [60] as
the number of IPsec tunnels increases, a slight degradation in voice quality can be
expected, also call setup rate decreases dramatically when an IPSec tunnel is used
which would potentially degradate the VoIP quality. For instance a corporate enter-
prise customer that uses IPsec VPNs to connect two sites might have the need for
many simultaneous VoIP calls over an IPsec tunnel and the call quality can badly be
affected unless sufficient VoIP prioritization is used.
Therefore, as the number of VoIP calls per tunnel increases, it is important to
determine whether this negatively impacts the voice quality or the rate of call estab-
lishment. This also proves the point that classification of VoIP traffic in an IPSec
tunnel is highly important for acceptable call qualities. Not only the cross traffic
which passing the local gateway or the proxy server used significantly affects the
VoIP call but also the memory and process intensive IPSec packet encapsulation and
decapsulation process negatively affects the VoIP call quality and the number of calls
can be made simultaneously.
The research completed in this thesis shows only one of the main metrics which
can have a negative affect on VoIP quality which is the affect of cross traffic in
VoIP in IPSec tunnels. Further research issues and final discussions about this
research with relevant outcomes can be found in the subsequent Conclusion chapter.
5.3 E-Model Evaluation of the Results
The E-Model [61] is a transmission planning tool that provides a prediction of the
expected voice quality, as perceived by a typical telephone user, for a complete end-
to-end (i.e. mouth-to-ear) telephone connection under conversational conditions. The
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E-model takes into account a wide range of telephony-band impairments, in particular
the impairment due to low bit-rate coding devices and one-way delay, as well as the
”classical” telephony impairments of loss, noise and echo. It can be applied to assess
the voice quality of wireline and wireless scenarios, based on circuit-switched and
packet-switched technology. [62]
The E-model is based on modeling the results from a large number of subjective
tests done in the past on a wide range of transmission parameters. The primary
output of the E-model calculations is a scalar quality rating value known as the
”Transmission Rating Factor, R”. R can be transformed into other quality measures
such as Mean Opinion Score [63], Percentage Good or Better ((GoB) or Percentage
Poor or Worse ((PoW). However, caution should be exercised when comparing these
transformed measures with values of MOS, %GoB or %PoW from other sources, which
may not have been obtained under comparable conditions. [62]
The E-model is based on a mathematical algorithm, with which the individual
transmission parameters are transformed into different individual ”impairment fac-
tors” that are assumed to be additive on a psychological scale. The algorithm of
the E-model also takes into account the combination effects for those impairments
in the connection which occur simultaneously, as well as some masking effects. To
the extent that impairments are present for which psychological additivity is not
maintained, E-model predictions may be inaccurate. [62]
Although human perception is not taken into account in E-Model, for the purposes
of this research E-Model evaluation of the obtained results were performed by using a
comercial WAN simulator with 100ms delay applied to all traffic. MOS calculations
were completed using an online MOS score calculator [64] using a modified E-Model
with jitter values taken into account although E-Model does not use jitter directly.
Results in tables show that with the presence of cross traffic MOS scores decreases
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G.711 E-Model Evaluation
G.711 No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic Cross Traffic & Proxy
Delay 118 ms 142 ms 127 ms
Jitter 12 ms 22 ms 14 ms
Packet Loss 0% 2% 2%
MOS 4.41 4.18 4.23
Table 5.3 G.711 E-Model Evaluation
G.723 E-Model Evaluation
G.723 No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic Cross Traffic & Proxy
Delay 129 ms 167 ms 142 ms
Jitter 14 ms 29 ms 16 ms
Packet Loss 0% 2% 2%
MOS 3.95 3.28 3.52
Table 5.4 G.723 E-Model Evaluation
G.729 E-Model Evaluation
G.729 No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic Cross Traffic & Proxy
Delay 139 ms 177 ms 163 ms
Jitter 13 ms 28 ms 19 ms
Packet Loss 0% 2% 2%
MOS 4.08 3.47 3.65
Table 5.5 G.729 E-Model Evaluation
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MOS Scores
Codec No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic Cross Traffic & Proxy
G.711 4.41 4.18 4.23
G.723 3.95 3.28 3.52
G.729 4.08 3.47 3.65
Table 5.6 MOS Score Results
greatly. Considering IPSec overhead, 100 ms introduced delay and 2% artificial loss
added by WAN simulator, poor MOS scores expected; however, the proposed proxy
system improved the MOS to better values. Overall MOS score range with all codecs
tested can be seen in the following table.
Results showed that the proposed system works well under heavy network con-
ditions (i.e. high packet loss rate, high latency) and improves a peer-to-peer IPsec
tunneled VoIP call quality by using a simple algorithm.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Following from the research questions posed earlier, the main objective set out for this
research was to design and implement a simple algorithm for VoIP classification in
IPSec tunneled networks that require very low CPU time and RAM usage. The aim
was to implement an algorithm that would feasibly be added to real proxy servers
and low end network devices. These endeavours were successful and a novel VoIP
in IPsec classification algorithm was devised and implemented. Experimental results
show the new algorithm significantly improves VoIP QoS.
The research presented in this thesis obtained a partial scholarship from an Aus-
tralian Based multinational WAN optimization company, namely Exinda Pty Ltd.
Also as a result of the work in this thesis two IEEE conference papers was presented,
one in Seoul, Korea (ICACT 2010) and another in Kyoto, Japan (ICEIE 2010). The
published papers can be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.
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6.1 Summary of Thesis
In Chapter 2 VoIP concepts and IPSec architecture have been reviewed in a detailed
fashion. Traffic classification techniques were discussed, and recent approaches to IP
traffic classification with encrypted data flows, including application layer encryption
such as SSL and network level encryption such as IPSec were analyzed. Although
ML techniques seem promising and produce good results, implementation of these
techniques requires more research in the area of network layer encrypted tunnels. Ex-
haustive literature review showed that proposed techniques do not have the necessary
features (low processing power and low memory requirements) to be implemented in
a real operational environment.
Chapter 3 discussed the relevant research questions which affected the research
direction and created new research areas in network traffic classification.
Chapter 4 proposed a very simple algorithm that proved the ability to classify VoIP
traffic in an IPSec tunnel by using simple algorithmic approaches. This research can
be used as guidance for practical VoIP classification in IPSec tunnels. For instance
an enterprise such as a university with a proxy that passes network layer tunnels runs
the risk of having high traffic to sites or services that would normally be banned. Any
VoIP in such a tunnel would have unacceptable QoS. The techniques shown in this
paper allow secure VoIP in a tunnel but slow down, and may practically eliminate,
non-VoIP traffic.
In Chapter 5 a test bed is described and research results presented that clearly
indicated that the ability to identify VoIP in such a tunnel can be of great use for real
network devices and so showed that research on traffic identification within network
layer tunnels has a practical and important application. The experimental network
showed significant performance increases for network layer tunneled VoIP with cross
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traffic when the VoIP component of the tunnel can be identified and given priority.
An E-Model evaluation showed that MOS scores increased significantly when the
proposed system is used to give priority to VoIP traffic in an overloaded network.
6.2 Future Work
This research has uncovered further interesting topics for the research community. In
addition to the basic research questions presented in Chapter 3, a new set of challenges
can be proposed as a result of this work.
For instance traffic identification within an encrypted IPsec tunnel also raises a
new set of security issues.
• If the nature of traffic (but not the content) can be identified does this represent
a security weakness for the user?
• What kind of counter measures can be predicted?
• Does the network operator need to respond with counter measures?
Future work based on this thesis will include testing the proposed scheme with
a greater variety of cross traffic including real time loads from real enterprises. The
current VoIP detection technique uses a simple algorithm for efficiency; however it is
likely that a more complex algorithm is needed to cope with peculiar cross traffic and
user countermeasures aimed at foiling VoIP/non-VoIP classification. It may also be
beneficial to create more complex algorithms to control the delay on non-VoIP traffic
to decrease the packet and data loss or make non-VoIP traffic deliberately unusable.
Also, CPU and memory usage of more complex algorithms have to tested. These
research issues have important practical applications and so are worthy of deeper
reflection and consideration.
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Appendix A
Published Papers
Following pages have the published papers throughout this research.
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Abstract-Research in traffic classification is reaching into
ever more difficult areas. Traditional techniques such as header
and payload inspection are not providing sufficient information
due to usage of non-standard ports and encryption. Promising
alternative methods have been proposed based on the statistical
behaviour of traffic flows. Although these methods can achieve
quite high accuracies in non-encrypted traffic flows, traffic
identification of encrypted traffic flows is still in its early stages.
We argue that the results to date for encrypted traffic cannot
help a network device such as a firewall make any useful decision,
nor are there any indications that this may be achieved in the
future. We propose a novel approach to cope with encrypted peer
to peer network layer tunnels which are a particular problem
in schools, universities, and larger corporate networks. First
statistical techniques are used to identify the protocols present, a
process that may take in the order of seconds. Next, based on the
protocols discovered, and enterprise policies, a network device is
advised to block, band-limit, or allow the whole tunnel, or a
range of packet sizes within that tunnel. Preliminary research
has concluded that VoIP traffic can be successfully handled
by this approach and that advise to a network device can be
practically useful. Work continues to apply these techniques to
other protocols and mixes of protocols within a peer to peer
tunnels.
Index Terms-Traffic Classification, VPN, Encrypted Traffic,
IPSec, VoIP
I. INTRODUCTION
With the evolution of Internet there has been a rapid
expansion in the number of applications and the way these
applications use encryption, protocols and ports. In the face
of these changes, traditional methods for traffic classification
have become inadequate thus making network management
ever more challenging.
Traditionally traffic classification is achieved by packet
inspection. Packets are analysed from their headers or pay-
loads. However, information extracted from packet headers
can be misleading. For example, emerging applications use
random port numbers instead of using standard ports. Some
application types can reuse standard ports, such the web-
browsing ports, for their own purposes. As the number of
application types increase, algorithms used to identify packet
payloads become more complex and the trade-off between
computational complexity and accuracy becomes an issue.
Encrypted traffic packet inspection is quite difficult since the
only obvious available parameters are packet lengths and inter-
packet arrival times. These two parameters led the research
community to study statistics of traffic flows rather than
network specific or application specific properties of packets.
Where the traffic flow is unencrypted, using just packet length
and inter-arrival time allows traffic classification to achieve
high accuracies when Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms are
used. A survey paper [1] identifies 18 significant works done in
ML field from 2004 till 2007. Interestingly, most of the work
done in ML algorithms is composed of non-encrypted traffic
with protocols such as Voice over IP or Video. Streaming
traffic within encrypted tunnels has not yet been investigated
thoroughly.
Although not studied extensively, these scenarios are ex-
tremely relevant to recent networks. Most corporate networks
employ Voice over IP systems as well as Video Conferencing
and use VPN to secure the packets from intruders. VPNs
are commonly used instead of leasing expensive dedicated
lines but in terms of network management, VPNs are quite
challenging. A VPN may be used to disguise large downloads
or other forms of traffic that would normally be banned by
enterprise policies as enforced by proxy servers, network
optimizers, or other network devices. Successful monitoring
and classifying of VPN traffic is thus quite critical to network
management. The literature to date on encrypted traffic iden-
tification research has focused on SSH [2] traffic.
In this paper we discuss existing approaches for encrypted
and non-encrypted traffic identification using ML techniques
as well as other algorithmic approaches. We then propose some
new algorithms for identifying traffic within encrypted tunnels
and new research directions which have not been studied or
only partially studied. The rest of this paper organized as
follows. Section IT reviews the relevant research for traffic
classification using Machine Learning Algorithms. Section
III reviews Encrypted Application classification techniques.
In both cases, achieved accuracies are discussed. Section IV
outlines the classification problem in virtual private networks.
Section V discusses promising preliminary results and plans
for a more comprehensive research program. Section VI con-
cludes the paper and considers some further implications of
identifying encrypted traffic.
II. CURRENT RESEARCH
A. Machine Learning for IP traffic Classification
The concept of Machine Learning is considered to be in the
field of artificial intelligence, and hence it can be defined as a
computing process of acquiring new knowledge depending on
existing knowledge. As defined in [1] it is a process of struc-
tural pattern recognition from given data. Machine Learning
techniques were first used in traffic classification for intrusion
detection [3]. For our purposes we use three sub-fields of
Machine Learning Algorithms, these are Supervised Learning
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Algorithms, Clustering Learning Algorithms (Unsupervised)
and Hybrid Learning Approaches.
1) Supervised Machine Learning: Supervised algorithms
are the type of algorithms which are fed with a so called
training set (Le. a data set in which there exists a pair of data
consisting of input and desired outputs). In this sense accuracy
of supervised algorithms would depend on the provided data
set since the following decisions will be made upon the
provided set. If the network traffic considered as homogeneous
(Le. does not change its behaviour dramatically in time) this
type of algorithms can be employed.
One of the promising methods is provided by Crotti et
al [4], where supervised learning used with three extractable
properties of IP packets; packet length, inter-arrival time and
order of arrival. They used so called protocol fingerprints
which are extracted from PDF vectors. Upon constructing
the PDF vectors, they used anomaly scores from 0 to 1 in
order to probabilistically estimate which incoming flow can be
classified for a given PDF vector. Results show that with 91%
accuracy they can identify HTTP, SMTP and POP3 protocols.
Although promising, they have not addressed the issue of
packet loss and jitter in their experiments. For applications
like VoIP packet loss and jitter is quite critical. They also used
HTTP as an application in which many new arising application
types can be hidden. They also assumed that starting point of
the flows can be caught, in the case of online deployment there
is always a case of missing the beginning of the flows. Such
capture may not be possible outside a VPN.
A supervised approach used by Li [5] uses C4.5 [6] decision
algorithm They categorized the Internet flow using classes
such as web-browsing, mail, bulk ftp, attack, peer-to-peer,
database, service, and interactive. They achieved 99% accuracy
using 1875 flows as a training set. They also addressed the
issue of accuracy versus complexity. Although mentioned there
is no data available for VPN traffic in their paper.
In 2005 Moore [7] used Nave Bayes technique to classify
application types. They used hand-classified data to be certain
of categories. They also gathered various feature sets such
as flow length, port number, inter-arrival time etc. However,
authors made the assumption that features such as port number
is available which would not be the case in tunnelled streams.
Also, pre-classified traffic can be misleading since traffic
patterns can change dramatically in time. Their internet traffic
classifications include bulk data, p2p, database, interactive,
WWW.mail. games and multimedia. They maintained 95%
overall accuracy using Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF)
methods. However, we have not been able to see any applica-
tion for VPN traffic scenarios.
All machine learning approaches concentrate on packet
type identification and result in a probabilistic measure that a
given packet serves a particular protocol. Such a probabilistic
measure is not of great use within real network devices.
Consider a VoIP stream where 90% of packets were correctly
identified, the 10% misidentified and blocked would render
VoIP unusable. Even in an FTP download the recovery from
lost packets would be an unwanted addition to the network
traffic.
2) Clustering Learning: Clustering has been widely used
for application classification. One of the earliest papers in this
area is proposed by McGregor et al. [8], in which application
types such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, IMAP, NTP and DNS are
studied. The authors did not attempt to classify each and every
application by itself rather their scheme used bulk transfer,
small transaction and multiple transactions as classification.
Therefore this paper suggested similarity patterns in a given
traffic. However, a better classifier should have the capability
of decision making which would include accelerating and/or
blocking individual application types such as VoIP . They used
Expectation Maximization [9] algorithm for clustering.
One other paper by Zander and Armitage [10], used Au-
toClass [11] algorithm for clustering and they studied game
traffic, Napster, AOL, HTTP, SMTP, Telnet and FTP traffic.
Their classifier was application specific however; one of the
issues about their proposal was that, given a number of appli-
cation types their classifier found a high number of clusters.
So, cluster to application mapping was a critical problem for
the efficiency and accuracy of the classifier.
Another attempt using the clustering method was proposed
by Bernaille et al [12], in which K-means algorithm was
employed. K-means algorithm is a clustering algorithm which
clusters the given data using a distance vector scheme. Their
classifier was TCP based and therefore other transport pro-
tocols such as UDP could not be employed. However, in
tunnelled networks transport protocol information is com-
pletely invisible. One other drawback of their proposal was
the assumption that the classifier can always get the first few
packets of the flow. However, this would not be the case
all the time because in probabilistic methods a packet may
be misclassified and so miss the start of a transaction. A
good classifier should catch the applications at any time. They
studied FTP, HTTP, Kazaa, NTP, POP3, SMTP, SSH, HTTPS,
POP3S.
One recent paper by Erman et al [13] also used K-means
algorithm for clustering and they studied web, p2p and ftp
traffic. In their study they assumed that training flows can be
identifiable from their payload and header information. One
other work by Junior et al [14], just studied p2p traffic and
tried to distinguish p2p traffic from the rest of the application
types. However, we could not see any further implementations
on VPN traffic.
Some researchers have studied several application types
and some studied only one type. From the application type
prospective we can state that file transfer, web, e-mail, p2p
type protocols have been studied. Only a few researchers
dealt with encrypted data however these consist of application
level encryption protocols which are tunnels containing only
one protocol. Such approaches will not suit Peer to Peer
network layer VPNs such as IPsec which may contain several
protocols and anyone time. Also, some assume that start of
each flow can be extracted and some assume that payload and
header information can be still used for training phase of the
algorithms. However, none of the studies deal with network
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level VPNs which may contain several protocol types in one
tunnel. In the most general VPN case no header or payload
information is available for the classifier so even in the training
phase might constitute an issue since the training is the core
part of the machine learning algorithms.
Another interesting paper by Jeffrey et al [15] addresses
the issue of mapping from cluster to application problem. The
problem is to map the existing cluster on to the application
type to be classified. If the number of clusters created by the
algorithm is greater than the number of intended application
types, classification becomes quite complicated. To solve
this problem the authors fed the clustering algorithm with
pre-labelled flows, which increased the overall performance.
However, again they assume that pre-labelling is available. In
VPN tunnelled flows we do not have any chance to have priori
knowledge about the content.
All machine learning approaches fully depend on the train-
ing data which may not always represent the general behaviour
of network traffic. The mentioned ML methods only generates
a probabilistic measure that a packet serves a given protocol.
Again such a decision is of little use to real network devices.
III. ENCRYPTED TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION
Regarding encrypted traffic classification, our analysis sug-
gests that most of the work focuses on either SSH or SSL
tunnels. There appear to many challenges and the accuracy
of identification is very low, also while application layer
tunnels can hold only one application per session, network
layer tunnels can hold more than one application per session.
For example, Charles et al [16] propose an empirical method
based on hidden Markov models which was applied to simu-
lated HTTPS, SSH and AIM. tunnels. Application types were
identified with only 20% accuracy.
A paper by Bernaille and Teixeira [17] created a model
to detect SSL traffic. They did not include network layer
tunneling and assume the ability to analyse the first few
bytes of SSL traffic before encryption which is not possible
for traffic put through a network layer tunnel their proposed
accuracy is about 85%.
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood [18] used two supervised
machine learning algorithms AdaBoost [19] and RIPPER [20]
to detect SSH traffic and classify applications inside SSH.
They showed that it is feasible that SSH type traffic can
be detected. However they only studied a small number of
applications and dealt with only application layer encryption.
Application types such as telnet, DNS and FTP are classified
with 99% accuracy. However, we could not find classification
proposals for delay sensitive applications such VoIP.
Marc and Neil [21], stated that application types of an
encrypted connection using HTTP can be inferred. In short
the existing work shows that although quite a few researchers
are studying traffic types and encryption we could see little
work related to classification of network layer VPN tunnelled
protocols and their application types. Again the identification
process results in a probabilistic measure that a packets serves
a particular protocol. Again this kind of statistical information
is not usable by commercial devices such as firewalls or
network optimizers.
IV. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
We aim to identify encrypted, tunnelled traffic in such a way
that network devices such as firewalls and network optimizers
can make use of that decision. First we must identify where
such a decision is important. There are two main types of
tunnels to consider.
The first type is a peer to peer VPN that connects an
individual computer to a remote service or other computer.
This type of implementation can be quite problematic in
a university or corporate network as protocols which are
banned or band-limited can be hidden from firewalls, network
optimizers, and proxy servers. For example real time video can
be hidden in a tunnel and the network devices just mentioned
cannot identify the traffic type.
Fig. I. Corporate VPN
The next type of VPN is the corporate VPN. In this case
the nature of the traffic can be identified after the VPN server
has decapsulated and decrypted the traffic stream. In this case
traditional packet inspection techniques can be used.
Fig. 2. Client Based VPN
The main application of traffic identification within en-
crypted tunnels is thus peer to peer tunnels which represent a
real concern in some networks.
A. A New Classification Decision Process
In our previous discussion it was seen that current research
uses packet statistics to give a probability that an individual
packet serves a given protocol. The accuracies reported even
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for non encrypted traffic are poor (around 90%), and the results
for tunnelled and encrypted traffic are totally unusable. A
network device cannot make a sensible decision based on such
information.
We propose a new and novel approach that makes prob-
abilistic information usable. First the identification process
aims to determine what protocols are present in a peer to peer
tunnel. Next advice is given to the network device to either
allow, block, or band-limit the entire tunnel, or packets within
a certain size range.
To see how this concept works, consider VolP traffic as
shown in Figure 3. VolP packets fall between certain size
limits and packets from this range are taken to be analysed for
size and inter-arrival time. After a period of time a decision
algorithm will decide that there is, or is not, VolP in the
tunnel. Similar decisions can be made about the presence of
streaming video, web browsing, FTP, and bit torrent down-
loads. Allowing the decision making process to occur over a
period of time allows the identification process to have much
more information to work with.
The next step is to give advice to the network device.
This advice is based on the mix of protocols discovered and
enterprise policies. The advice options are to block a tunnel,
band limit a tunnel, or allow a tunnel through. In the case
of VolP it is possible to apply these decisions to a range of
packet sizes rather than the entire tunnel.
TABLE I
SKYPE CODECS
Codec Mean Standard Deviation Sampling Freqency
SVOP 156.32 12.47 16 kHz
iLBC 89.49 8.18 8 kHz
0729 70.96 5.13 8 kHz
packet size distribution, most packets lie between 50-200 byte
length. One other interesting result is that Skype traffic packet
size is normally distributed. Looking at the standard deviations
it is clear that most of the Skype traffic can be gathered
if a suitable size window is applied. To find out the exact
percentage of traffic which can be classified we can employ
basic properties of normally distributed samples. Assume that
p, is the mean and (1 is the standard deviation of a normal
distribution. For any p, and (1,99.6% of observations fall within
3(1 standard deviation of the mean that is p, + 3(1 and p, - 3(1.
Following these fundamental properties we can conclude that
for all different codecs in use it is possible to identify 99.6%
of VolP traffic in the range of 56-194 bytes. In figure 7 it is
possible to see the overall picture of probability densities of
the codecs we tested. We have also tested the avaliable Skype
traces against a FTP download trace retrieved from our local
labs at RMIT university.
MiltedTramc
SVOP
In figure 8 it possible to see that the density of FTP packets
are lying in the MTU range. This also proves our point that
VolP sessions can be detected when FTP and HTTP sessions
share a network layer tunnel. It is also important to clarify
that VolP traffic we tested was using UDP as a transport
layer protocol. However, we acknowledge the fact that Skype
traffic can also be transmitted with TCP. Testing TCP based
Skype traffic against other TCP based applications is left as a
future implementation. However, our initial trials showed that
although Skype traffic can be encapsulated in a TCP datagram,
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V. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
As a preliminary analysis we studied VolP traffic from
Skype because, like all VolP systems, it has some significant
statistical characteristics which can be identified within several
seconds. Available traces of Skype traffic were obtained from
[22]. The new scheme depends only to packet size however
using inter-arrival time may improve the system as well. We
analyzed different voice codecs since codec usage changes
the basic statistical structure of the traffic. The following table
shows the mean and standard deviation of the packet sizes
from each available codec as well as the theoretical sampling
frequency.
In figures 4, 5 and 6 we show graphically the probability
distribution and cumulative probability distribution of SVOP,
iLBC and G729 codecs in terms of individual packet sizes.
Although different codec usage changes the behaviour of
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due to its signalling properties the size of the packets would
still have distinct statistical properties.
The simulations done to date are very interesting and
provide a solid basis for practical implementation in real
network devices. We are currently implementing a system with
peer to peer VPNs and a Network Optimizer between them.
The aim is to allow VoIP packets to pass unhindered but band
limit or perhaps even block download traffic such as bit torrent
and FfP. It would appear that VoIP is easy to identify even
when mixed with FrP but we intend to investigate identifying
VoIP in the presence of many other protocols. We also aim to
investigate learning methods for other protocols of practical
interest to network management, in particular streamed video
and download traffic.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reviewed recent approaches to IP
traffic classification with encrypted data flows, including ap-
plication layer encryption such as SSL and network level
encryption such as IPSec. The most promising of these ap-
proaches use some form of Machine Learning but current
research has only been applied to application layer tunnels.
There is still much work to be done before packets can be
identified within network layer encrypted tunnels. In other
words the identification decisions made by these systems
cannot direct any useful activity by network devices such
as network optimizers, firewalls and proxy servers. We have
proposed a new two step approach suitable for peer to peer
network layer tunnels that can generate advice that is useful
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to network devices-
• Identify the protocols present over a period of time based
on statistical properties. In our preliminary studies we
used just the PDF of the packet sizes over several seconds.
• Given the protocol identification, and enterprise policies,
advise the network device to block the tunnel, band limit
the tunnel, or allow the tunnel through at full speed. In
the case of streamed traffic such as VoIP this may be
applied to a sub-range of packet lengths.
The identification algorithm used in this paper was very
simple, just build a PDF of the packet sizes and identify
protocol classes based on the observed peaks. Our prelimi-
nary results indicate it is possible to tell if a peer to peer
tunnel contains VoIP, web browsing, download traffic, or
some combination thereof. These results can help a network
optimizer at a school or university tell if someone is hiding
a download within a peer to peer network layer VPN. We
expect it will be possible to identify streaming video of various
types though it will probably not be possible to differentiate
between different download protocols. This paper used one
of the simplest identification algorithms and there is some
interesting research to be done developing more sophisticated
identification algorithms which have more accurate and faster
protocol identification.
Traffic identification within a network layer encrypted tun-
nel raises a new set of security issues. Does the identification
of traffic types pose a security risk? What methods can be used
to confuse the identification and when is it appropriate to use
such techniques? These very important topics are worthy of
deeper reflection and consideration.
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Abstract— Research in traffic classification has become more 
challenging with the emergence of new applications and new 
ways to hide the true nature of traffic. The accuracy of traffic 
identification methods has become more important due to the 
greater use of delay sensitive applications such as VoIP and 
video over IP which need to be identified and given priority. 
Traditional techniques such as header and payload inspection 
are not providing sufficient information to identify traffic types 
due to the usage of non-standard ports, tunnelling and 
encryption. Promising methods have been proposed based 
around statistical behaviour of traffic flow. Although these 
methods can achieve quite high accuracies in non-encrypted 
traffic flows, traffic identification of encrypted traffic flows is 
still in its early stages. In this paper, we will review the recent 
work done on encrypted traffic identification, particularly 
network layer encryption using statistical techniques and 
propose a remarkably simple technique for VoIP traffic 
identification in IPSec peer to peer tunnels. More importantly 
it is shown that VoIP/non-VoIP classification can be used to 
dramatically improve VoIP QoS and may be used to effectively 
block non-VoIP traffic in an IPSec tunnel.   These results point 
to the usefulness of the technique and the desirability to find 
more discriminating VoIP identification algorithms for IPSec 
tunnels. 
 
Keywords—VoIP, IPSec, Tunnelled Traffic, Machine Learning  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Accurate traffic classification is quite critical for 
network management in enterprise or campus networks. 
Management of these networks requires complex checking 
of every packet to ensure network security and to 
conformance with institutional policies. For instance in an 
enterprise network, file sharing by means of torrent 
networks is often banned due to its complicated copyright 
issues and bandwidth costs, online gaming is banned, and 
accessing certain web sites is blocked due to their illegality. 
There are a variety of network management techniques 
available such as using proxy servers and/or statefull 
firewalls but these often rely on accurate application 
identification.  New threats to accurate identification mean 
that blockage will be far from ideal in tomorrow’s networks. 
Application identification can be thwarted by quite 
simple techniques such as tunneling or encrypting desired 
applications. For example an increasingly common 
technique used by students is to use a peer to peer tunnel to 
hide bit torrent downloads.  Up to date network traffic 
identification in tunneled scenarios is quite immature and 
this field needs more research for very practical reasons - if 
encryption and tunneling become wide spread then firewalls 
and proxies become far less effective compromising both 
network security and bandwidth control. Even without 
tunneling or encryption, traditional techniques such as port 
blocking or deep packet inspection can be bypassed quite 
easily. Port altering is quite common in bandwidth hungry 
applications such as Bittorent. Usually certain ports are not 
blocked by firewalls or proxy devices, such as HTTP port 
80. However, emerging Bittorent client software can send 
its traffic through port 80. In this case bandwidth usage can 
increase dramatically and time critical traffic such as VoIP 
can be badly affected. 
While security and access control is a critical, modern 
networks also have to achieve and acceptable Quality of 
Service (QoS). For instance a good VoIP implementation 
requires that the delay, jitter and bit error rate of the link 
should be minimized. The delay introduced by traffic 
classification can reduce the QoS thus classification must be 
both accurate and fast. 
This paper examines the specific and important case of 
VoIP/non-VoIP identification in a peer to peer, network 
layer encrypted tunnels.  This has practical importance as 
secure voice may well be allowed by corporate policies, but 
it is currently impossible to stop the tunnel being used for 
non-VoIP protocols such as bit torrent downloads.  
Experimental results confirm that VoIP identification in an 
IPSec tunnel is possible and can be used to keep VoIP QoS 
acceptable even under extreme network conditions. 
The rest of this paper organized as follows. Section II 
reviews the relevant research for traffic classification using 
Machine Learning Algorithms and Encrypted Application 
Classification techniques. In both cases, achieved accuracies 
are discussed. Section III outlines an algorithm that enables 
VoIP classification within an IPSec tunnel. Section IV 
discusses results and accuracy of the method proposed. 
Section V concludes the paper and considers some further 
implications of identifying encrypted traffic and future 
research directions.   
II. CURRENT WORK 
Literature review section of this paper is divided into two 
major parts. In the first part, the usefulness of VoIP 
identification in tunneled networks is discussed. In the 
second part, the recent research efforts on traffic 
identification are discussed. 
 
A. The Benefits of VoIP Identification in Tunnels to 
Network Administration 
In this section the usefulness of VoIP identification in 
tunneled networks will be discussed and its benefit to 
network administration explained.  The benefits justify the 
effort of trying to identify VoIP in an IPSec tunnel.  VoIP 
implementation is in great demand for modern networks as 
it is much cheaper than traditional telephony.  
 
To understand why it is needed to identify VoIP traffic 
in secured networks consider Figure 1, a common 
configuration for a corporate network. 
1) Proxy Servers and affect on Network 
 
 
Figure 1. Using proxy server in Networks 
 
A proxy server acts as an intermediate device between a 
client and a destination, usually a server.  The advantage of 
a proxy server is that it can enforce enterprise policies, 
enhance security and cache resources locally and so reduce 
external traffic. 
Although proxy servers increase the security levels by 
protecting internal hosts from unknown or unwanted 
communications they can also be seen as a bottleneck which 
can introduce delays and jitter. Therefore, when a VoIP 
session is tunneled through a proxy device, identifying VoIP 
and giving appropriate priority in a timely manner is critical 
to maintaining QoS.  
2) Bandwidth Limitations 
Limited bandwidth availability is a major concern for 
VoIP traffic. While VoIP adds little to network traffic it can 
be badly delayed when other protocols make heavy network 
demands, for example a large FTP session. With un-
encrypted traffic, traditional packet inspection can give 
priority to VoIP and slow down FTP and so maintain an 
acceptable VoIP QoS. When VoIP is hidden in an encrypted 
tunnel it cannot be identified and given priority thus the 
QoS becomes unacceptable.  
 
 
 
3) Banned Tunneles Due to Corporate Policies 
Another scenario is where enterprise policy dictates that 
all tunneled traffic is banned to ensure a proxy server can 
properly function. If tunneled traffic is allowed then it 
becomes quite trivial to initiate a Bittorent session using a 
tunnel and so bypass the proxy. Since Bittorent is a major 
concern in terms of both network bandwidth and copyright 
laws many enterprises would like to stop tunneling but 
cannot do so because of the wide spread and legitimate use 
of peer to peer tunnels for VoIP. If it is possible to identify 
VoIP (and other legitimate traffic) within a tunnel then a 
proxy server could successfully allow legitimate tunnels and 
block illegitimate tunnels.  
B. Machine Learning for IP Traffic Classification 
The previous section discussed why it is important to 
identify VoIP in an IPSec tunnel.  This section examines 
existing research on general classification which may be 
useful for our goal.  The vast majority of relevant papers 
come from the field of Machine Learning.  The concept of 
Machine Learning is considered to be in the field of 
artificial intelligence, and hence it can be defined as a 
computing process of acquiring new knowledge depending 
on existing knowledge. As discussed in [1] it is a process of 
structural pattern recognition from given data. In the first 
appearance of Machine Learning technique in classification 
were used for intrusion detection [2]. For the purpose of this 
paper we use three sub-fields of Machine Learning 
Algorithms; these are Supervised Learning methods, 
Clustering Learning methods (Unsupervised) and Hybrid 
Learning approaches.  
1) Supervised Learning Algorithms 
Supervised algorithms are type of algorithms which are 
fed with a training set (i.e. a data set in which there exists a 
pair of data consisting of an input and a desired output).  
The efficiency of supervised algorithms very much depends 
on the provided training set which is used to classify the real 
data. As long as the network traffic in question is to be 
considered homogeneous (i.e. does not change its behavior 
dramatically in time) this type of method can be used. 
A promising method was provided by Crotti et al [3], 
where supervised learning has been employed with the three 
extractable properties of IP packets; packet length, inter-
arrival time and order of arrival. They used so called 
protocol fingerprints which are identified from PDF vectors. 
After constructing the PDF vectors, they used a score based 
algorithm from 0 to 1 in order to probabilistically estimate 
which incoming flow can be classified for a given PDF 
vector. Results show that with 91% accuracy they can 
identify HTTP, SMTP and POP3 protocols. Although 
promising, they have not employed algorithm to delay 
sensitive applications such as VoIP. Also time it takes for 
their algorithm to identify packets has not been discussed. 
For applications like VoIP packet loss, jitter and delay is 
quite critical. Therefore overall processing time of the 
algorithm is a critical measure for efficiency. They also used 
HTTP as an application but this is problematic today as 
many new applications hide themselves by masquerading as 
HTTP. It is also assumed that the initial point of the flows 
can be caught. Such capture may not be possible when the 
traffic is tunneled.  
A supervised algorithm employed by Li [4] uses the 
C4.5 decision algorithm [5]. In their paper Internet flow is 
categorized using distinct classes such as web-browsing, 
mail, bulk ftp, attack, peer-to-peer, database, service, and 
interactive. They results showed about 99% accuracy using 
1875 flows as a training set to feed C4.5. They also pointed 
out the issue of accuracy versus complexity in their work. 
Although tunneled traffic mentioned there is no application 
of their algorithm to VPN or tunneled traffic in their 
research. 
A paper by Moore [6] used Naïve Bayes technique to 
classify different application types. They used hand-
classified data to use as a training set. They also gathered 
various feature sets from their training set such as flow 
length, port number and inter-arrival time. However, the 
proposed technique cannot be applied to tunneled traffic 
streams since the port numbers would not differ for any 
specific application. Additionally, pre-classified traffic can 
be misleading since traffic patterns can show dramatic 
changes over time. Their traffic classification results shows 
bulk data, p2p, database, interactive, www, mail, games and 
multimedia can be classified with a 95% overall accuracy 
using Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) methods. 
However, we have not been able to see any application for 
VPN or tunneled traffic scenarios for their algorithm.  
2) Clustering Algorithms 
Clustering techniques has been widely used in research 
for application classification. One of the earliest papers in 
this area is proposed by McGregor et al. [7], in which 
application types such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, IMAP, NTP 
and DNS are studied. Instead of classifying each and every 
traffic type the authors rather used a scheme to identify 
similar traffic types such as bulk transfer, small transaction 
and multiple transactions as classification. They used 
Expectation Maximization [8] algorithm as a clustering 
technique. However, since their scheme did not try to 
identify critical traffic types such as VoIP, FTP or WWW it 
would not be logical to employ this method to real system to 
accelerate and/or block individual application types such as 
VoIP.   
A paper by Zander and Armitage [9] used the AutoClass 
[10] algorithm for clustering traffic types such as game 
traffic, Napster, AOL, HTTP, SMTP, Telnet and FTP 
traffic. Their classification scheme was application specific 
however; given a number of application types the scheme 
they propose found a more number of clusters than 
application types to be classified. Therefore, there exists a 
problem of mapping application to a specific cluster which 
is a critical problem for the efficiency and accuracy of the 
classifier.  
Another proposed approach using a clustering method 
was proposed by Bernaille et al [11], where the K-means 
algorithm was employed. The K-means algorithm is a 
clustering algorithm which clusters the given data using a 
distance vector scheme. Their classifier was TCP based and 
therefore other transport protocols such as UDP could not be 
employed. However, in more general scenario where 
tunneled traffic is also in use transport protocol information 
is completely invisible. One other drawback of their 
proposal was the assumption that their scheme can always 
get the first few packets of the flow in question. However, 
this would create issues since in probabilistic methods a 
packet may be misclassified and initial transaction can be 
missed. A good classifier should catch the applications at 
any time. They studied FTP, HTTP, Kazaa, NTP, POP3, 
SMTP, SSH, HTTPS, POP3S.  
One recent paper by Erman et al [12] also used K-means 
algorithm for clustering and they studied web, p2p and ftp 
traffic. In their study they assumed that training flows can 
be identifiable from their payload and header information, 
again not an option for tunneled traffic.  
Researchers up to date studied many application types 
available in today’s networks. Some chose to classify every 
application by itself some used a similarity approach and 
classified in a larger classes. From the application type 
prospective we can state that file transfer, web, e-mail, p2p 
and some game traffic type of traffic have been studied. 
However only a few researchers dealt with encrypted data 
and some work consisted of application level encryption 
protocols. Some authors assume that start of each flow can 
be extracted and some assume that payload and header 
information can be still used for training phase of the 
algorithms. However, none of the studies deal with tunneled 
application types and their identification. Also, work done 
up to date concentrated on new algorithms and methods for 
traffic identification. None of the studies tested on a real 
network environment where any significant improvement 
has been made on a specific application type such as VoIP. 
In the most general tunnel case no header or payload 
information is available for the classifier even in the training 
case phase.  
C. Encrypted Traffic Identification 
Regarding encrypted traffic classification, most of the 
literature focuses on either SSH or SSL traffic rather than 
IPSec which is the focus of this paper. Due to its challenges 
this type of traffic identification is in its early stages. For 
example, Charles et al [13] propose an empirical method 
based on hidden Markov models, in the tunneled scenarios 
application types can be identified with up to 20% accuracy. 
They used simulated tunnels over HTTPS, SSH and AIM.  
A paper by Bernaille and Teixeira [14] created a model 
to detect SSL traffic. They did not include tunneled versions 
and assume the ability to analyze the first few bytes of SSL 
traffic before encryption which is not possible for traffic put 
through a network layer tunnel. 
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood [15] used two 
supervised machine learning algorithms AdaBoost [16] and 
RIPPER [18] to detect SSH traffic and classify applications 
inside SSH. They showed that it is feasible that SSH type 
traffic can be detected. However they only studied small 
number applications and dealt with only application layer 
encryption.  
The existing work on encrypted and tunneled 
identification shows that although quite a few researchers 
are studying traffic types and encryption there appears to be 
little work related to classification of network layer tunneled 
protocols and their application types.  This opens a fertile, if 
rather difficult area of new research. 
D. VoIP Traffic Classification in IPSec Tunnels 
VoIP traffic is delay and jitter sensitive and QoS is 
reduced if either get too high. Proposed ML techniques need 
large computation efforts therefore it is usually not good 
practice to employ ML for VoIP classification in memory 
limited devices or in large proxy devices due to load on 
them.    
One of the issues that this paper tries to address is, 
finding a simple enough algorithm for VoIP identification 
and prioritization in IPSec tunnels which can be deployed 
easily to a small network device or proxy server. Research 
to date mainly concentrates on the identification of traffic 
types rather than their applicability to a real working system 
and its benefit such as improvements of QoS of VoIP 
traffic.   
III. ALGORITHM PROPOSAL 
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the 
identification of VoIP will improve VoIP QoS and may 
slow down other protocols, even to the stage where other 
protocols become unusable.  This could allow a proxy to 
ensure that network layer tunnels carry VoIP but not other 
traffic.  Unless this is demonstrated to be true then the 
creation of VoIP detection algorithms for network layer 
tunnels is a pointless exercise.   
An excellent test bed can be made from a simple proxy 
server which passes VoIP and other traffic from one host to 
another.  This server should first pass just VoIP, and then be 
stressed with cross traffic as would be the case with real 
network devices.  Next the same tests are performed with a 
VoIP detection algorithm that allows VoIP to be given 
priority and other traffic delayed in which case significant 
performance improvements should be seen to VoIP. 
For the purpose of this paper a very simple VoIP 
detection and control algorithm has been formulated.  Very 
little other network traffic has the packet length of VoIP 
traffic, typically in the range of 60 to 150 bytes.  If a data 
packet is within this range it will be passed through 
immediately, otherwise it will be delayed to cause non-VoIP 
traffic to slow down.   
IV. TEST BED AND RESULTS 
The implementation used the popular Netfilter libraries 
and Linux firewall system iptables. The system benefits 
from the libnetfilter API and it is based on the so called 
“queue” chain of iptables. Figure 2 demonstrates the basic 
architecture used. 
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Figure 2. System Level Architecture of Proposed System 
 
It can be seen from the Figure 2 that the key VoIP 
identifier in user space therefore it can be easily controlled 
by a network administrator and avoids the need for kernel 
programming. When a packet comes to the first network 
interface of a proxy device it runs through the pre-routing 
phase where it is decided whether the packet is going to be 
modified or any NAT decision be made. After the routing 
decision is made it is sent to the FORWARD to be put into a 
QUEUE which invokes the VoIP identifier. This identifier 
looks at the packet and its own record of packet history to 
decide whether or not this packet is most likely a VoIP 
packet.  A VoIP packet is passed straight through the system 
whereas anything else is queued for 100ms to give priority 
to VoIP packets.  The Proxy of Figure 2 was implemented 
using GNU/Linux Kernel 2.6 with a 1.86 GHz CPU and 2 
Gigabytes of Ram. Proxy device has a standard Gigabit 
Ethernet controller however host devices have 100 Mbit 
Ethernet controllers.    
The test environment examined three distinct scenarios. 
In the first scenario two host machines are connected 
through IPSec   The second scenario uses the same situation 
but adds 2.5 megabits of random cross traffic.  This is 
sufficient to seriously stress the proxy system.  In the third 
scenario VoIP/non-VoIP detection is turned on and is used 
to slow non-VoIP traffic.  
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Figure 3. First Test Bed Using a Proxy Device 
 
Table 1 shows an overall view of our results obtained. 
Our analysis include the packet size of each codec used, 
average inter arrival times and affect of cross traffic and our 
proxy system.   Note that the heavy cross traffic did not just 
delay VoIP it actually slowed down the rate at which VoIP 
traffic is sent out of the proxy.  For example 1 second of 
VoIP traffic on the proxy input would take 1.5 seconds to be 
transmitted from the proxy output.  This situation mimics a 
network device which is in overload and is dropping packets 
in order to cope with buffer overflow. 
TABLE I.  AVERAGE INTER-ARRIVAL TIME OUT OF PROXY 
 Inter Arrival Time (seconds) 
Codec No Cross Traffic With Cross Traffic 
Cross Traffic & 
Proxy 
G711 0.020 0.030 0.020 
G723 0.038 0.051 0.040 
G729 0.020 0.026 0.021 
 
Above table suggests that cross introduced inter-arrival 
times increases about 50% which is not an acceptable value 
in a VoIP call. However, the proxy system successfully 
decreases the average values to acceptable ranges. Although 
these values show the significant improvement in the 
system, these are only average values which cannot analyze 
the change in jitter conditions which is also an important 
parameter in VoIP calls. To address that issue we have done 
a packet analysis for each codec. 
In our test environment we used three different codec 
types G711, G723, G729. As a base test we sent all traffic 
from 10.0.1.2 to 10.0.2.2 the results are in Figure 4. It was 
observed that traffic was quite stable and average inter 
arrival times of each observed packet distributed quite 
homogenously with low jitter values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4. First Test: No external Traffic 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of packets when cross 
traffic is introduced. It is obvious that VoIP traffic is 
distorted with the cross traffic and inter arrival times vary 
greatly.   
 
 
Figure  5. Second Test: With significant cross Traffic 
 
As a final test the proxy system prioritized VoIP traffic 
when cross traffic is present. In Figure 6 it is obvious that 
the system decreases the distortions in the packet inter 
arrival times and prioritize the VoIP traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  6. Third Test: with cross traffic and delay for non-VoIP 
 
Figure 7 shows the analysis of G711 codec when there is 
no cross traffic, when there is cross traffic and when our 
proxy system works in the presence of cross traffic. It is 
observed that cross traffic increases the distortion greatly 
and the proxy system significantly decreases the affect of 
cross traffic and increases performance.  
 
Figure  7. Three Tests for G711 Codec 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have reviewed recent approaches to IP 
traffic classification with encrypted data flows, including 
application layer encryption such as SSL and network level 
encryption such as IPSec. Although ML techniques seem 
promising and produce good results, implementation of 
these techniques requires more research in the area of 
network layer encrypted tunnels. This paper has clearly 
shown that the ability to identify VoIP in such a tunnel can 
be of great use for real network devices and so shows that 
research on traffic identification within network layer 
tunnels has a practical and important application. Our 
experimental network shows significant performance 
increases for network layer tunnelled VoIP with cross traffic 
when the VoIP component of the tunnel can be identified 
and given priority   
An enterprise such as a school with a proxy that passes 
network layer tunnels runs the risk of having high traffic to 
sites or services that would normally be banned.  Any VoIP 
in such a tunnel would have unacceptable QoS. The 
techniques shown in this paper allow secure VoIP in a 
tunnel but slow down, and may practically eliminate, non-
VoIP traffic.  
Traffic identification within an encrypted tunnel also 
raises a new set of security issues.  If the nature of traffic 
(but not the content) can be identified does this represent a 
security weakness for the user?  Does the user need to 
respond with counter measures?  What counter measures 
could be used?  
Future implementations will include testing proposed 
scheme with a greater variety of cross traffic including real 
time loads from real enterprises. The current VoIP detection 
technique uses a simple algorithm for efficiency; however it 
is likely that a more complex algorithm is needed to cope 
with peculiar cross traffic and user countermeasures aimed 
at foiling VoIP/non-VoIP classification.  It may also be 
beneficial to create more complex algorithms to control the 
delay on non-VoIP traffic to decrease the packet and data 
loss or make non-VoIP traffic deliberately unusable. These 
research issues have important practical applications and so 
are worthy of deeper reflection and consideration. 
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